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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Identifying the Problem 
During the closing decade of the 20th century, we are approaching the 
end of one of the most remarkable transitions in the history of 
agriculture. Agricultural production has been transformed from a land-
dependent production process to a technology-driven production process. 
All increases in food production, in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world, 
must come from higher yields (Kuznets, 1977). Expansion of agricultural 
production, thus, will have to be obtained entirely from intensive 
cultivation made possible by advances in science and technology. The 
implication of this transition emphasizes the role of effective research 
and its management, so as to ensure that agricultural production can meet 
the growing and diverse needs of the next century. 
Over the last several decades economists have conducted studies of the 
impact of research on the productivity of agriculture (Griliches, 1958; 
Evenson, 1968; Pray, 1978; Cline, 1975; White and Havlicek, 1982; Braha and 
Tweeten, 1986). These studies have differed in their focus of inquiry. 
Some studies focussed on aggregate levels of productivity; others focussed 
on a specific commodity at national, regional or state level. All the 
studies, however, reach the same conclusion that economic returns to 
investment in public agricultural research have been very high in 
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comparison to almost any other public investment. Results of a large 
number of studies (see Table 1) indicate rates of return to be well over 10 
to 15 percent - the level that private firms consider"adequate to attract 
investment. 
The contribution of research to increased agricultural productivity 
has been studied primarily by two methods by studies looking at ex post 
evaluations (Norton and Davis, 1981). The first method, called the "index 
method", uses cost-benefit analysis to determine returns to investment in 
research. Benefits are measured as the residual after all other factors 
that contribute to increased productivity have been accounted for. The 
calculated returns represent the average rate of return per dollar invested 
over the period studied, with benefits from previous research assumed to 
continue indefinitely. The second method, called the "regression analysis 
of productivity", estimates the incremental return from increased 
investment, rather than average returns from all investment. This method 
estimates the component of change in increased productivity that can be 
attributed to research. Because regression methods are used, the 
significance of the estimated returns from research can be tested 
statistically. 
The estimates of rates of return from the index method and the 
regression method are presented in Table 1. Almost all studies indicate 
high rates of return to investment in public agricultural research. These 
rates are considerably higher than those for other public sector 
Investments, ranging between 30 and 60 percent, and have stayed at that 
high level from 1940s through to 1980s. 
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Table 1. Summary of agricultural research productivity studies 
(Ruttan, 1982) 
Annual 
Rate of 
Return 
Study Country Commodity Time-Period (%) 
Index Number 
Griliches, 1958 USA Hybrid corn 1940-•1955 35-40 
Griliches, 1958 USA Hybrid sorghum 1940-•1957 20 
Peterson, 1967 USA Poultry 1915-•1960 21-25 
Evenson, 1969 South Africa Sugarcane 1945-•1962 40 
Barletza, 1970 Mexico Wheat 1943-•1963 90 
Ayer, 1970 Brazil Cotton 1924-•1967 77 
Peters and 
Fitzharris, 1977 USA Aggregate 1937-1942 50 
1947-1952 51 
1957-1962 49 
1957-1972 34 
Pray, 1978 Punj ab Ag. Research 1906-1956 34-44 
Pray, 1980 Bangladesh Wheat 1961-1977 30-35 
Regression Analysis 
Griliches, 1964 USA Aggregate 1880-1938 35 
Peterson, 1967 USA Poultry 1915-1960 21 
Evenson, 1968 USA Aggregate 1949-1959 47 
Evenson and Jha, 1973 India Aggregate 1953-1971 40 
Cline, 1975 USA Aggregate 1939-1948 41-50 
Bredahl and 
Peterson, 1976 USA Cash grains 1969 36 
Evenson and Asia Rice 1950-1965 32-39 
Flores, 1978 1966 -1975 73 
Evenson, 1979 USA Aggregate 1863-1926 65 
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From an economic perspective, the rule for optimum investment is that, 
as long as the internal rate of return is higher than the opportunity cost 
of capital, it is profitable to increase the stock of knowledge by 
investing in research. The persistently high rates of return to public 
agricultural research have lead some authors, notably Ruttan (1982), to 
argue that there has been underinvestment in agricultural research. 
According to this argument, the wide margin between the average returns and 
the opportunity cost of capital implies that not enough resources have been 
invested in research that would bring down the rates to levels comparable 
to other public sector investments. This study analyzes the issue of 
underinvestment and provides insight as to why there has been insufficient 
demand for research in agriculture. Before doing this, however, the 
accuracy of rate of return estimates is addressed. 
Early studies on the role of investment in agricultural productivity 
presented "external" rather than "internal" rates of return. In the 
"external" method the annual flow of benefits is divided by the accumulated 
costs and expressed as a percentage. This rate of return is highly 
sensitive to the rate of interest used to reflect the opportunity cost of 
capital. The "internal" rate, on the other hand, is the rate of interest 
that makes the accumulated present value of the flow of costs equal the 
discounted flow of benefits at a given point in time. These two accounting 
methods give very different results. For example, Griliches (1958), using 
a 5 percent opportunity cost of capital, calculates the "external" rate of 
return to hybrid corn research to be 743 percent which converts to 37 
percent in terms of the "internal" rate. This rather large difference in 
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the two rates lead researchers to be cautious about the rate of return 
studies. 
The estimation procedure of the rate of return to research involves 
three steps (Scobie, 1979): (1) measuring the shift in the supply curve to 
estimate the output-increasing effect of technological change, and given 
the shift, computing the gross annual research benefit; (2) computing the 
costs of the project; and (3) estimating the social profitability of the 
investment by a discounted cash-flow analysis. Hertford and Schmitz (1977) 
point out that, regardless of the methodology used, accurate estimation of 
the change in production attributable to research is the most crucial step 
in an effort to measure the productivity of research. The standard 
approach measures the social surplus resulting from a shift in the supply 
curve due to the technical change. Linder and Jarret (1978) note that 
accurate surplus measures depend on the shape and level of supply and 
demand curves. The results of earlier studies, particularly those of 
Griliches (1958) derive from assuming a perfectly elastic supply curve. 
Two types of shifts are commonly considered in the literature: a "pivotal" 
shift and a "parallel" shift. Linder and Jarret (1978) have analyzed the 
effect of the type of the curve chosen and have shown that estimates of 
gross benefits can vary sixfold depending on the nature of the shift. 
Several methodological problems concerning the measurement of benefits 
have been noted by Linder and Jarret (1978), Scobie (1979), and Rose 
(1980). In particular, estimates of social loss due to absence of the new 
technology are made by ignoring the other possible scenarios that might 
have prevailed. These omissions cause a bias in the estimation of the 
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benefits. Further, introducing trade and price policies, and government 
intervention in general, can change the results. Akino and Hayami (1975), 
in their study on rice program in Japan, show that in the absence of trade, 
producers would have been net losers from agricultural research. 
On the cost side, the rate of return studies suffer from two problems. 
First, it is argued that spillover effects originating in the public good 
character of research are not internalized. Second, the costs of diffusion 
and assimilation are not counted. That is, these studies fail to take into 
account the complementary nature of the inputs and the related education 
and extension and marketing costs incurred to realize the productivity 
gains from the adoption of new technology. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the assumptions employed in the early 
rate of return studies, particularly those within the index number 
framework, did lead to exaggerated rates of return estimates. However, 
most of the recent studies account for the complementary nature of inputs 
and assume divergent supply function shifts. The production function 
studies explicitly taken into account the complementary effect of inputs. 
In fact, with the recent studies incorporating most of the earlier 
criticisms, it is likely that they underestimate rather than overestimate 
returns to public agricultural research (de Janvry and Dethier, 1985; 
Ruttan, 1987). Also, with internal rates ranging between 30 and 60 
percent, it is difficult to conceive that the true rates are so low so as 
not to justify more investment in agricultural research. 
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B. Motivation and Objective of Study 
An explanation for the continued high rates of return is offered by 
the underinvestment hypothesis. Evenson, Waggoner, and Ruttan 
(1979, p. 67) assert that high rates of return are indicative of 
underinvestment and assert that "there is little doubt that a level of 
expenditure that would push rates of return to below 20 percent would be in 
public interest." According to the underinvestment hypothesis, at the 
margin, public investment in agricultural research has a higher rate of 
return than any other area of public expenditure and that a reshuffling of 
fiscal priorities is in order, within a fixed total budget. 
Studies examining the productivity of research in agriculture make a 
case for the underinvestment thesis, but do not explain why investment in 
research activities is so low. These studies say very little about the 
research-resource allocation and the underlying factors that determine this 
allocation. Behind the rate of return estimates are price and quantity 
relationships involving supply and demand curves and their interactions 
which generate the observed levels of return. 
This study analyzes demand for public agricultural research. The 
objective is to perform theoretical modeling and econometric analysis of 
the demand for public agricultural research by state governments. The 
theoretical models are built upon the public choice models of pure and 
impure public goods. Demand functions are derived from these models and 
fitted using U.S. annual data from 1951-1982 for the 48 contiguous states, 
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and stF.tistical tests are performed to evaluate their performance. 
The motivation for modeling agricultural research as a public good 
derives from the nature of agricultural research, which is characterized by 
varying degrees of nonexcludability and nonrivalry. Nonexcludability 
occurs when potential beneficiaries from the good can only be excluded from 
using the good at a prohibitive cost or difficulty. Nonrivalry refers to 
the condition that the use of a unit of the good by one agent does not 
diminish the consumption amount available from the same unit for the other 
agents. Agricultural research produced by any state is available for all 
the other states to use without depleting the amount available. If these 
properties hold strictly, a good is referred to as a pure public good. 
When one or both of these properties do not hold perfectly, the good is 
referred to as an impure public good (Cornes and Sandler, 1986, p. 6). 
Most public goods are modeled as impure public goods. For these goods the 
provider of the good can exclude certain beneficiaries, at a reasonable 
cost, from consumption of the good, or the nature of the good is such that 
it gets used up, to some extent, in consumption. 
When exclusion is impossible and there is nonrivalry in consumption of 
the good, production through private initiative does not occur. Provision 
of the good entails a unanimous collective agreement between beneficiaries 
and the producers. Two things may prevent the spontaneous emergence of 
such an agreement. First, if exclusion is not possible, a beneficiary is 
induced not to take part in the collective agreement and still benefit from 
the good provided by other agents. This is referred to as free-riding in 
the literature and is used to characterize the situation when one agent 
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relies on public good supplied by others (Comes and Sandler, 1986, p. 22). 
Free riding leads to an inefficient solution. If, in the limit, every 
agent attempts to free ride, the public good will not be produced. 
Secondly, whatever the situation on exclusion, the transaction and 
information costs necessary to reach an agreement may prevent its 
achievement -- all the more so when the number of agents concerned is 
large. In these cases, there arises the need for a public agent (i.e., 
government) to achieve as far as possible what these free private 
arrangements would have done and to provide the public good to the optimum 
point. 
A considerable amount of work in the literature on public goods has 
been devoted to public sector expenditure modeling. The issue as to why 
certain goods have to be provided through the budget and the related "good" 
(in terms of efficiency and equity) tax structure form the basis of this 
literature. Early reference to government's role in the provision of goods 
and services that could not be exchanged through the market was made by 
Hume, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. Wicksell (1967) noted that though 
the provision of the public goods, like private goods, should be in line 
with individual preferences, provision of public goods could not be 
implemented through a voluntary exchange. A political process of budget 
determination by voting was needed to reveal preferences. Lindahl (1958) 
introduced the notion of 'pseudo demand curves' and defined an equilibrium 
for public goods as the point where vertically aggregated demand curves 
intersect the supply schedule. Lindahl's formulation, with its vertical 
addition of demand curves, was a significant feature of Samuelson's 
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formulation (1954). In the Samuelson model, efficient allocation called 
for an equality of the marginal rate of transformation of the public and 
private good with the sum of marginal rates of substitution in consumption. 
Lindahl's model was compatible with Samuelson's outcome. 
In recent years work on provision of public goods has focussed on 
comparing the properties of different equilibria that result from different 
conjectures under which public goods may be supplied (Cornes and Sandler, 
1984a, 1984b; McGuire and Groth, 1985; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986; 
Andreoni, 1988; McGuire, 1990). Provision of public goods has been 
analyzed mainly for the Nash-Cournot and Lindahl allocatioual equilibria 
and compared to the Pareto efficient equilibrium. Under the Nash 
conjecture, agents adjust their provision of public good contribution 
independently, given the optimizing choice of the other agents. A Nash-
Cournot equilibrium is based on self-interested utility maximization and 
results in a suboptimal solution, as will be seen in the next chapter. The 
Lindahl equilibrium is achieved as the result of a cooperative game in 
which agents, given their individualized tax share, determine the utility-
maximizing public good quantity. When such an equilibrium is attained, it 
is Pareto efficient. Besides these two commonly used conjectures, agents 
can be assumed to make choices under non-Nash conjectures — - that is, when 
agents anticipate that their own optimizing choice influences decisions of 
other agents. This implies replacing the assumption of zero conjectures 
with the assumption of nonzero conjectures. 
In this study, agricultural research will be modeled as a public good 
and its provision level analyzed for the two polar cases of cooperative and 
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noncooperative behavior, viz, Nash-Cournot and Lindahl equilibria. 
Specifically: 
(1) Demand for agricultural, research is analyzed by modeling it as a public 
good. Agricultural research is modeled as a pure public good and as an 
impure public good model and allocation rules are derived for both these 
formulations. Under the general impure specification two models are 
analyzed in particular - the joint product model and the joint-use model. 
In the joint product model, agricultural research is regarded as an input 
that gives rise to two outputs - one purely public in nature, and the 
other purely private. The effect of the private good, jointly produced 
with the public good, on equilibrium conditions is analyzed and compared to 
the case where there are no joint products produced. The implications for 
the possibility (and extent) of free riding are analyzed. 
In the joint-use model agricultural research is regarded as an impure 
public good for which, like other impure specifications, the jointness in 
consumption is not complete. However, unlike other public good 
formulations, pure or impure, the aggregate level of the public good in the 
joint-use model is fixed for agents providing the good. That is, the 
aggregate level of (feasible) public good that can be provided is fixed. 
This may be viewed as a two-step optimization in which, at the first step, 
the aggregate amount of the public good to be provided is determined, and 
at the second step, the individual agents determine their own provision 
levels. For the case of agricultural research this occurs when Congress 
allocates funds for research, and thereby, determines the total level of 
agricultural research that may be provided. Given this fixed level of 
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funds, each state determines its own level of provision. Analysis of this 
model will show how the additional constraint affects equilibrium 
conditions and the related provision levels. This is of particular 
importance to agricultural research, given the recent shift in the mix of 
federal funding from emphasis on formula funds to competitive grants. 
Formula funds are allocated to states depending on the size of the rural 
population and the number of farms in the state. Competitive grants, on 
the other hand, are fixed amount of funds for which the states (research 
stations) compete to finance their own research program. The results from 
joint-use model will show how this shift in funding will affect the 
provision of agricultural research. The same model would also be 
applicable to the provision of any other public good or service at the 
state or local level for which the funds are fixed by the budgeting 
process. 
(2) The various public good formulations discussed above are analyzed for 
two specific games under which the various agents are hypothesized to 
operate. We analyze state legislature's behavior for the two polar cases 
of cooperative and noncooperative behavior - Nash-Cournot and Lindahl. 
The equilibrium conditions from each of these models are related to the 
optimality conditions. 
(3) Most developments of public good models stop with a comparison of the 
equilibrium conditions and their dissimilarity with the optimal conditions. 
Given the different equilibrium conditions there is no way to test, 
empirically, the public good specification that most adequately describes 
demand for the public good. In this study, empirical specifications of the 
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reduced-form demand functions are derived for several different public good 
models and, econometric techniques are used to try to identify the public 
good model that gives the best representation for the demand for public 
agricultural research. The econometric procedure would distinguish between 
the pure public good model and the joint product model. This would also 
help identify the (degree) of publicness of the good without assigning any 
numerical measure. The empirical specification and the tests between the 
different specifications are carried out without specifying any functional 
form for the utility function. 
(4) The set of demand functions derived in this study take account of the 
simultaneity of decisions that arises from analyzing equilibrium models. 
Most earlier studies do not take account of this simultaneity and derive 
demand functions for the equilibrium position, independent of the decisions 
of the other agents^. 
(5) Finally, this study uses the non-nested technique of the J test to 
identify the allocational behavior of the state legislatures. That is, 
this test will allow us to determine whether the state legislatures are 
engaged in a noncooperative Nash game or they use a cooperative Lindahl 
strategy while determining the provision of agricultural research. The 
presence of private aspects from research, if shown to hold by the joint 
product model, would lead one to suspect that decisions are made in a 
noncooperative environment. In general, studies analyzing demand for 
public goods use the Nash game as the most plausible scenario in which 
am grateful to Dr. Wayne Fuller fcr his help in the econometric 
specification of the simultaneity of decisions. 
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decisions are made. The results from the J test will support or refute 
this supposition. This is important because this assumed conjecture, on 
the part of the agents, has not been previously tested in the literature. 
The J test evaluates the adequacy of each model independently and 
acceptance (or rejection) of one model does not imply automatic rejection 
(acceptance) of the competing model. Thus, in our case, the J-test might 
reject (or accept) both the Nash-Coumbt and the Lindahl model. This would 
point to the fact that more work needs to be done in the literature in 
modeling agent's behavior. This issue will be discussed in greater detail 
later in the dissertation. 
C. Brief History of U.S. Agricultural Research System 
Since this study focusses on the U.S. agricultural research system, a 
brief review of the structure of the agricultural system would be 
imperative to understanding of the modeling of agricultural research and 
its underlying assumptions. The U.S. agricultural research system is a 
federal-state system in which state and federal agencies are involved. The 
institutionalization of public-sector responsibility for research in 
agricultural science and technology can be dated to the 1860s. The Morrill 
Act of 1862 provided land-grants to states for the support of colleges 
where the main object was teaching courses in agriculture and the mechanic 
arts. It also established the Department of Agriculture which became the 
first federal authority under which a nationwide agricultural research 
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system was to develop. 
The institutional pattern that emerged created a dual federal-state 
system. The federal system developed more rapidly than the state system, 
but it was not until the end of the 19th century that either the state or 
the federal system acquired any significant capacity to provide the 
scientific knowledge needed to deal with agricultural development. 
The demand for knowledge about relationships in agriculture grew 
rapidly in the states. The first state experiment station, the Connecticut 
State Agricultural Experiment Station, was established in 1877. Before the 
passage of the Hatch Act in 1887, which provided federal funding for the 
support of public agricultural experiment stations, only a few states were 
provided any significant financial support for agricultural research at the 
state level. It was only after the 1920s that an effective national 
agricultural research system at both federal and state levels had been 
established. 
The Hatch Act of 1887 caused a «ignificant increase in U.S. public 
sector funding of agricultural research. Between 1897 and 1931 there was a 
rapid increase in public funding, with the rate being around 8.2 percent 
per annum. Between 1931 and 1951, the rate of growth fluctuated with no 
net growth occurring over this period. From 1951-1978, the rate of growth 
was 6.4 percent per annum. 
Public agricultural research in state agricultural experiment stations 
is supported by federal and nonfederal funds (Table 2). Part of the 
federal funds are based on a formula that depends on the number of farms in 
the state and the size of the nonfarm population. The nonfederal funds 
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Table 2. Major funding sources for public agricultural research, 
all SAES, 1969 and 1984 (USDA-CSRS, 1969, 1984) 
1969 1984 
Sources of Funds $ 1984 thousands % $ thousands 
Total Federal Funds $ 231,260 
CSRS Administered 139,648 
Other USDA 20,479 
Other Federal 71,132 
Total Nonfederal Funds 503,710 
State Funds 400,055 
Product Sales 
Industry 
Other 103,655 
Total $734,970 
31.5 $ 295,996 27.9 
19.0 180,950 17.1 
2.8 33,327 3.1 
9.7 81,719 7.7 
68.5 763,347 72.1 
54.4 591,356 55.8 
14.1 171,991 16.2 
100.0 $1,059,343 100.0 
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Table 3. Private sector research expenditures in 
constant 1984 Dollars, 1900-1985 (Huffman and Evenson, 
forthcoming) 
Years Total Production Percent 
($ mil, 1984) ($ mil. 1984) Production 
1900-1909 247.2 205.6 83.2 
1910-1919 347.7 268.8 77.3 
1920-1929 352.1 251.4 71.4 
1930-1939 749.8 475.2 63.4 
1940-1949 471.0 275.3 58.5 
1950-1959 890.6 575.0 58.5 
1960-1969 1367.8 848.0 62.0 
1970-1979 1569.6 884.2 56.3 
1980-1985 2444.7 1429.5 58.5 
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include a state's own allocation to agricultural research plus the private 
funds channeled through state experiment stations. During the early years, 
federal funding provided a large share of the state experiment station 
support, i.e., 82.6 percent in 1888. Since that time nonfederal -
primarily state government funds - have grown much more rapidly. In 1955, 
40 percent of the support was federally provided, and this relative support 
fell to 27.9 percent in 1984. State governments provided about 55 percent 
of SAES funding in 1969, which rose to 72 percent in 1984. 
Agricultural research expenditures by the private sector on its own 
research have exceeded those of public sector (USDA and SAES) for all 
decades except the 1940s. In 1984, private expenditures were 63 percent 
higher than public expenditures. However, for the period from 1956-1982, 
private expenditures were 1.3 percent higher than the public expenditures 
(Huffman and Evenson, forthcoming). Table 2 gives the private sector 
research expenditures from 1900-1985. As can be seen, private expenditures 
are an important source of funds for agricultural research. 
In this study, however, we will focus only on state government 
decisions on SAES research. Decisions by USDA on its own research 
activities in the state and by private industry on its research expenditure 
are ignored. SAES research and private sector research have been shown to 
have different research foci (Huffman and Evenson, forthcoming). SAES 
research is dominated by biological sciences. The basic and applied 
biological science fields account for 80 percent of total SAES 
expenditures. Private sector research, on the other hand, has shifted from 
focus on technology field to emphasis on utilization-nutrition research. 
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The different research foci suggest that public and private research 
efforts might complement each other. 
In Chapter II, the theoretical modeling of agricultural research as a 
public good is presented. Various models of public goods are examined and 
reduced-form demand functions for each of these models are derived. In 
particular, Nash-Coumot and Lindahl specifications for agricultural 
research are presented. Chapter III lays out the data and the empirical 
specification for the demand functions derived from the theoretical models 
in Chapter II. Also, the methodology of the J test, to test between the 
alternative allocation schemes, is presented. Chapter IV presents the 
econometric results from fitting these models to U.S. annual data. Results 
from the J-test will help distinguish between the two allocational schemes 
and show which allocational pattern is followed by the state legislatures. 
Finally, in Chapter V, a summary of the results will be presented and the 
results will be evaluated to make policy predictions ; also areas for future 
research will be identified. 
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II. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
A. Brief Review of Literature 
This chapter investigates, with the use of a theoretical framework, 
the implications when agricultural research is provided by individual 
(public) agents. Research activity generally occurs in a mixed scenario: 
basic research activity is carried out at federal research institutes, 
whereas applied research is provided by state institutions. This, as shown 
by studies discussed later in the chapter, is due to differences in the 
public/private mix of characteristics of the two types of research. 
Agricultural research has been extensively analyzed. An impressive 
and growing body of literature on expost studies shows high economic 
returns to investments in agricultural research. Ruttan (1984) cites 
numerous empirical studies in the United States and abroad in which annual 
internal rates of return to public investment have been estimated to range 
between 30 to 35 percent. Other studies have focussed on issues relating 
to the financing of agricultural research. Schultz (1971) argues that 
agricultural experiment stations have the attributes of an economic 
decision-making unit and respond to demand and supply factors. 
Misallocation occurs due to relatively high social rates of return and the 
fact that these returns are so widely diffused that they usually have 
effect's outside the economic and political boundaries of origin. 
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The above way of analyzing agricultural research assigns an almost 
passive role to the aspect of demand. These studies assume that the 
relevant decision-making unit (e.g., an experiment station, a state or a 
country) demands some predetermined level of research. The issue of 
interest then is to evaluate whether this investment alternative can 
generate high returns, and to analyze the associated financing problem. A 
few studies, however, have tried to determine and test empirically factors 
that influence demand for agricultural research. Huffman and Miranowskl 
(1981) use a four-equation model of resource allocation, consisting of 
demand and supply equations for research, an equation for allocation of 
government revenues and an expenditure identity. In their study, the 
demand for indigenous research by a state is hypothesized to be a function 
of the size of the agricultural sector of that state, other characteristics 
of a state's agricultural output, agricultural input prices, farmers' 
education and extension and agricultural research in other states. The 
last variable is included to account for two opposing effects. If new 
research is directly borrowable between states, it leads to "free-riding" 
causing demand for indigenous research to fall. If, on the other hand, new 
research cannot be directly applied by other states it leads to a 
'competing' effect that increases the demand for indigenous research. 
Their empirical results indicate that states do not want to lose their 
comparative advantage and hence 'competing' effect dominates for 
subregional applied research whereas there is evidence of "free-riding" for 
regional basic research. Their study also indicates that wealthier states 
(based upon per-capita state government revenue) and more agriculturally 
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oriented states (measured by size of agricultural output per-capita) invest 
heavily in public agricultural research. 
A different approach is employed by Rose-Ackerman and Evenson (1985) 
in explaining interstate differences in demand for agricultural research. 
They hypothesize a political model in which politicians seek to maximize 
their chance of re-election, given a state tax bill of fixed size and the 
level of state personal income. Thus, the state legislator must decide 
what share of tax revenues should be allocated to agricultural research and 
extension. Their results indicate that state demand for research is 
influenced not only by level of farm income and size, as found by other 
studies, but also by measures of inter-governmental influence and the 
political effectiveness of farmers. Their study supports the finding of 
Huffman and Miranowski (1981) that states try to free ride on the basic 
research of neighboring states, and find evidence of free-riding for 
livestock (i.e., basic) research. Rose-Ackerman and Evenson's study is 
thus broader in its context and includes economic as well as political 
determinants of state spending on agricultural research. Guttman (1978) 
arrives at a similar result that lobbying activities, by increasing the 
political effectiveness of its constituents, influences demand for 
agricultural research. The results of his study show that per capita "state 
support for agricultural research is related to the size distribution of 
farmers, co-operative memberships, firms producing inputs, borrowable 
research and the proportion of owner operators. Thus, the same conclusions 
emerge that demand for agricultural research is determined in an economic 
and political setup. 
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A recent study by Judd, Boyce and Evenson (1986) focusses on demand 
for agricultural research at the international level. In their model a 
social planner maximizes some measure of aggregate income, given the 
resource base of the economy, which includes a given stock of technical 
knowledge. Growth can be achieved through various alternatives ranging 
from additions to arable land to development of location-specific 
agricultural technology. Each alternative has a different cost 
configuration which can vary over time and space. 
The empirical specification of their model includes variables for 
total agricultural production, those for demand conditions, possibility of 
arable expansion, diversity of agricultural production, scientists man-
year and a proxy for the price of research. They also include variables to 
account for free-riding effects between countries within the same geo-
climatic zone and those due to the domestic location of an International 
Agricultural Research Center (lARC). Their results support the findings of 
the earlier studies that spending on agricultural research is an increasing 
function of total agricultural production and its diversity, and inversely 
related to the cost of research. Interestingly, they find evidence of net 
free-riding only in the industrialized countries. This could be explained 
in terms of a comparable technical level of the industrialized countries 
and, hence, an innovation by any one country can be easily adopted by the 
other countries. They find no evidence of free-riding on domestic IARC 
spending for developing countries and, in fact, presence of IARC stimulated 
net national spending which in turn had a positive effect on spending by 
neighbors in the same geo-climatic zone. A reasonable explanation for this 
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can be sought in that research activity of lARC is generally broad-based 
and basic in nature which in turn stimulates domestic research expenditure 
on a more 'country-specific' applied type of research. Increased spending 
by neighbors indicates that 'competing' effect dominates the free-riding 
effect. 
Studies cited above have primarily an empirical form. They have not 
explicitly derived research expenditure decisions from models of optimal 
behavior. Although these studies have tested for the presence of free-
riding, they have not modeled it within a theoretic framework. By 
obtaining reduced-form demand functions within an optimizing framework, 
this study, will help determine the extent of free-riding and identify 
conditions under which it can be reduced. 
In particular, this study models agricultural research as a pure 
public good and an impure public good. Under the impure specification, two 
alternate models are analyzed - joint product and joint-use. Agricultural 
research, which is an input, is assumed to give rise to pure public and 
pure private benefits under the joint product specification. The private 
output refers to that part of agricultural research, produced at the state 
agricultural experiment stations, which is specific to that particular 
state and can not be used by any other state. The pure public output 
refers to that part of research that can flow freely across state 
boundaries. The joint product model has been analyzed by Cornes and 
Sandler (1984a) and has been applied to models of charity and national 
defense expenditures (Posnett and Sandler, 1986; Murdoch and Sandler, 
1989). The model used in this study to analyze agricultural research draws 
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heavily on Cornes and Sandler (1984a). 
The remainder of this chapter analyzes demand for agricultural 
research activity by the states. Agricultural research is carried out at 
three institutions in a state - the state agricultural experiment 
stations, USDA research centers, and private research institutions. In 
1969, 41 percent of total public agricultural research activity was 
performed by USDA agencies; by 1984 the USDA's share had fallen to 34 
percent. In 1969, state institutions performed 59 percent of total public 
agricultural research activity, which rose to 65 percent in 1984. Thus, 
state agricultural research activity has been steadily increasing over the 
years, and at present, state research stations constitute the major 
providers of public agricultural research. Research activity at the 
private research institutions and at USDA centers will affect research 
activity at state experiment stations. In this study, however, we focus 
only on state government decisions for agricultural research carried out at 
the state experiment stations. 
Section A considers agricultural research activity to be a pure public 
good. We study the allocation of resources to research by the state 
governments under Nash-Coumot and Lindahl assumptions. Individual 
optimizing behavioral rule is compared to that which would maximize 
society's welfare. Such a simple representation of research activity, 
however, hardly describes the real situation. A more realistic depiction 
occurs when state's research activity is modeled as an impure public good, 
in which either the condition of nonexludability or of nonrivalry or both 
do not hold strictly. 
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In Section B, we model research activity as an impure public good. 
Two cases of impurity are considered; the joint product case in which 
agricultural research is an input that gives rise to some output that is 
purely private to the state producing the research, and to some output 
which is purely public; and the joint-use model in which the aggregate 
level of (feasible) agricultural research is fixed for the states. This, 
we feel, is a correct representation for federal funds when aggregate 
research activity is determined by Congress and therefore taken as fixed or 
as a parameter for each state decision. Given the allocation for total 
research activity, each state decides how much to take out of the given 
pool of funds for its own research activity. Two considerations will 
affect the demand for an individual state's research activity - the desire 
to free ride when benefits are not perfectly excludable and the potential 
loss of spillins to the i-th state caused by its own demand. We compare 
individual demand functions for Nash-Cournot equilibrium under the general 
externality and the joint-use case and see which one is further from 
society's optimal demand. As our last model, we combine the joint-product 
specification with joint-use and derive individual (Nash) behavioral rule 
and the associated demand functions. 
B. Pure Public Good Models 
1. Pareto optimum 
A widely used criterion to evaluate and compare alternative resource 
allocation positions is that of Pareto-optimality. A Pareto optimum is a 
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societal equilibrium in which no one agent can be made better-off without 
making at least one other agent worse-off. A change in the resource 
allocation that raises the welfare of one agent without lowering that of 
any other agent is said to be a Pareto-superior move. To derive a Pareto-
optimum, one agent's utility is maximized subject to some predetermined 
utility level of the other agents and, subject to the relevant resource 
constraints (Comes and Sandler, 1986). A Pareto-optimal position is 
generally not unique since it depends on the preset utility levels of the 
other agents (i.e., the income distribution) and changing these utility 
levels will result in a different Pareto-optimum. Further, it is based on 
ordinal concept of efficiency since it does not rely on intensity of 
preferences or interpersonal comparisons of utility. Analyses of Pareto 
optimality, thus, stops short of interpersonal comparisons. If a change in 
an allocation improves the position of some individuals but causes a 
detriment in the utility level of others, then such a position cannot be 
evaluated in terms of efficiency. The "best" among all these optima can be 
chosen, however, by using a social welfare function that weights the 
utility levels of the agents according to some rule that does not violate 
Pareto-optimality (for example, Samuelson-Bergstrom welfare function). 
The Pareto criterion, which involves making only Pareto superior 
moves, is applied to the distribution and production of goods, referred to 
as exchange and production efficiency, respectively. For private goods, 
exchange efficiency is obtained if every possible reallocation of goods 
that increases utility of one or more individuals causes a reduction in the 
utility of some others. If there are only two goods consumed, and they are 
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X and y, then this occurs when the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is 
equalized across all agents 1 and j: 
Production efficiency is attained when an increment in the quantity of 
one good by a realldcation of resources between goods causes a decrement in 
the quantity of some other good. This, like the consumption case, is 
achieved when the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between 
each pair of inputs is equated across all industries using these inputs. 
If production of x and y is with inputs labor (L) and capital (K), then, 
METS^  - . 
A Pareto optimum for private goods is attained when the exchange and 
production efficiency conditions hold simultaneously. The exchange and 
production sides are tied together through the top-level condition which 
requires 
(MRS^ - MRS^  ) - MRS - MRT 
xy xy' xy xy 
where the MRT ^ is the marginal rate of transformation between x and y and 
indicates the opportunity cost of one good in terms of the other, given 
inelastically supplied factors and production efficiency. The MRS in the 
top-level is the equalized MRS over all agents and shows the willingness of 
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the society to transform x into y. 
The conditions for Pareto optimality formulated above are not valid 
for public goods. Since public goods simultaneously benefit all the 
members of the community and it is not possible for any one individual to 
appropriate a public good for personal consumption, total rather than 
individual valuations matter in deciding the resource allocation. The 
production efficiency condition remains intact since publicness does not 
affect the need to produce efficiently. There is no exchange efficiency 
condition because the property of nonexcludability precludes exchange. Let 
be i-th agent's contribution of the public good; and Q the total amount 
of the public good available for the community of n individuals, i.e., 
n . 
2 q - Q. Then, the new top-level condition is 
i-1 
S MRS„ - MRT„ . 
i-1 Qy Qy 
This condition is obtained by maximizing the utility of any one 
individual, subject to given utility levels of the others, and the 
economy's transformation function. 
In the models that are developed below, we assume the relevant 
agent(s) are the state governments which make decisions on public 
agricultural research and other state government expenditures. A (direct) 
utility function is assumed to reflect the preferences of the state 
legislature. This function is defined over a composite private good, y^ , 
agricultural research, Q, and an environmental variable, E^. The state 
legislature chooses the optimizing quantities of y^, and q^ , given E^. We 
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Impose certain regularity constraints on the utility function so that the 
necessary conditions we obtain are the sufficient conditions for a maximum 
as well. In particular, we assume that the utility function is twice 
continuously dlfferentiable, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-
concave in its arguments. We can represent the utility function of the 
i-th state's legislature as: 
U^- u (^y^, Q : E^ ). 
The Pareto problem can be expressed as follows: 
Max _ u^ (y^ , Q : E*") 
(yi.qi) 
subject to U^(yj, Q ; E^) & j / i, i.j-l n 
F( Y. Q ) < 0 , 
n . 
and Y - Z . (II.1) 
i—1 
Utility of agent i (i.e., of the state legislature) is maximized subject to 
given utility levels of the other n-1 state legislatures and the aggregate 
transformation function. The transformation function can be replaced by an 
aggregate budget constraint to reflect the production capacity of the 
economy. Thus we get. 
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n 
. p^Y - PqQ - 0 , (II.2) 
i "1 
where I are the revenues of the i-th state government, and SI is the 
i-1 
aggregate resource endowment of all the states, is the constant marginal 
cost of y and P^ is the constant marginal cost of Q, agricultural research. 
i -i 
Maximizing U subject to (II.2) and the given utility levels, U , j /i , 
will give the following first-order condition (FOC): 
Equation (II.3) implies that at a Pareto-optimal allocation, the sum 
of the marginal valuations (over all n states) should equal the price 
ratio. Let the optimizing quantity for the i-th state be Q . Then at a 
Pareto optimum Q^* - ...- Q^* ' That is, the equilibrium 
quantities of all agents should satisfy equation II.3. 
2. Nash-Cournot model 
This is a model of noncooperative behavior in which each state 
legislature is engaged in self-interested utility maximization and adjusts 
its public good contribution independently. Formally, a Nash equilibrium 
is defined as a strategy profile such that no single player (e.g., state 
legislature) by changing its strategy can obtain higher utility if other 
players stick to their best strategies. In our model, each state 
legislature holds zero conjecture about the effects of its optimizing 
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choice on the choice of the other states. A zero conjecture implies that 
each state legislature believes that its optimal choice will not influence 
the choice of the other state legislatures. The resulting equilibrium is 
typically not Pareto optimal because each state contributes to the 
provision of the public good up to the point where its own MRS is equal to 
the price ratio, whereas a Pareto optimal solution requires equating the 
sum of the MRS to the price ratio. 
We assume each state legislature's preferences are represented by a 
utility function that satisfies the regularity constraints imposed earlier. 
Thus, the i-th state's utility function is 
- U^(yl, Q : E^ ) , 
where y^  is i-th state legislature's consumption of the private good, Q is 
the public good consumption level and is the environmental variable. 
The total level of agricultural research consumed is the sum of that 
provided by state i ,q^, and the amount of the spillins, which are assumed 
""î i to be perfect substitutes, from the other n-1 states, Q Each 
state is assumed to face a linear budget constraint 
I' - V + v' ' 
where are the state revenues of the state government, including 
intergovernmental transfers. These transfers include formula funds 
allocated to states for agricultural research activity in the states. The 
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formula funds are based on the relative size of the agricultural sector in 
the state. The expenditures on agricultural research, thus, include the 
state allocations for research and the federal formula funds allocated to 
that state for research. In this study, however, we focus on the state's 
share of expenditures on research. 
The state legislatures, in addition to the budget constraint, face a 
prevailing public good contribution constraint, 
Q - . (II.4) 
The i-th state legislature maximizes its utility, U^ , subject to the 
two constraints and thereby determines its optimal agricultural research 
activity, i.e., q . We can incorporate the public good constraint (II.4) 
into the budget constraint and redefine the i-th state's maximizing problem 
as a decision on the aggregate level of the public good instead of only its 
own contribution (for a similar treatment see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 
1986; Comes and Sandler, 1986). This specification, in which each state 
makes its choice over the aggregate level of the public good, yields 
reduced-form demand functions in a form that can be readily compared with 
equations derived from an alternative cooperative solution to public 
decisions on resource allocation - Lindahl. 
By adding PQ to both the sides of the budget constraint we can 
express the decision problem facing the i-th state legislature as choices 
on y^ and the aggregate level of the public good Q^ : 
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Max U^Cyl, Q^ ; E^ ) 
(yi.qi) 
subject to ^ + P_Q^  - P + P 
"V "" V  
> ql ' (II.5) 
where F^  is defined as full income. The constrained optimization, as shown 
in Appendix A, yields FOCs that can be expressed in terms of marginal rates 
of substitution as: 
MRS^ - PQ /Py . i-1 n (II. 6) 
Let the optimizing levels of quantities that satisfy equation (II.6) 
be denoted by y '^^  and There exists a vector of such equilibrium 
quantities, each element of this vector being the equilibrium quantity of 
the private good and public agricultural research of each state 
legislature. 
The above FOC implies that each state contributes to the provision of 
agricultural research until the marginal valuation of research equals the 
marginal cost. If agricultural research can potentially provide benefits 
to other (possibly all) states at the same time, then there is an incentive 
for each state legislature to understate its preferences in order to be 
able to free ride. This strategy by all states legislatures leads to 
underprovision of the public good - agricultural research. 
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A Nash equilibrium to (II.5) is achieved when there exists a vector of 
y^ 's and Q^'s such that y^^ ) solves the model and is the same for 
each state. As noted earlier, when regularity constraints are imposed on 
the utility function, the FOCs are both necessary and sufficient for a 
maximum. If the associated bordered Hessian determinant, |H|, is 
restricted to being positive definite^, then using the implicit rule we can 
write the reduced-form demand equations for y^ and as: 
yi" - yi (F^ PQ. Py! E^), i-1 n 
(pi, Pq ,Py; E^ ). i-1 n (II.7) 
For each state its subscription demand for the community level of 
agricultural research is a function of full income and the prices of y and 
Q. A state's own derived demand for research activity is found by 
subtracting the spillins from the aggregate demand: 
q"-" - qfcpi, PQ. Py: E^ ) - qi . i-l n 
3. Lindahl model 
Lindahl equilibrium attempts to solve the problem of determining the 
levels of public goods to be provided and their financing by adapting the 
A^ strictly quasiconcave utility function implies that the 
|H(  ^0 which is insufficient to rule out a zero value. 
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price system in a way that maintains its central feature of an efficient 
allocation based on voluntary market activities. Instead of some political 
choice mechanism or coercive taxation, the Llndahl scheme has agents facing 
individualized prices at which they might buy the public goods. In 
equilibrium, these prices are such that everyone demands the same level of 
public good and thus agrees on the amount of the public good to be 
provided. 
Foley (1970) derives individual demand functions for public goods that 
depend on the prices of both private and public goods, and defines them as 
choices of quantities that maximize utility subject to budget constraint 
defined by prices and agent's endowment. Thus, the quantity demanded of 
any public good at a particular price vector differs with individual 
preferences and endowments. However, the nature of the public goods 
requires that all agents' consumption of the public good be equal. If, 
therefore, prices are to lead to the same quantity of the public good, then 
the prices charged should be different across consumers so as to reflect 
differences in preferences and endowments. It should be noted that agents 
follow standard price-taking behavior as in Walrasian equilibrium. The 
Llndahl equilibrium establishes an analogue to competitive market 
equilibrium for private goods and, if attained, is Pareto efficient. There 
is an interesting duality here between the definition of private and public 
goods on one hand, and the properties of equilibrium prices on the other. 
In terms of quantities, for private goods the sum of individual quantities 
should add up to the total quantity produced, while for public goods 
individual consumption equals aggregate production. In terms of prices, on 
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the other hand, for private goods each consumer's price equals the producer 
price, while for public goods individual consumer prices add up to the 
producer price. However, one of the major drawbacks of this equilibrium 
concept is the proclivity for strategic misrepresentation of preferences. 
With private goods, individuals facing given prices have clear incentive to 
reveal their true preferences by equating their marginal rates of 
substitution to relative prices. With public goods, this no longer holds. 
Because an individual has the same quantity of good available whether she 
pays or not, she has an incentive to misrepresent preferences and free 
ride. However, authors such as Roberts (1979), and Truchon (1986) have 
shown that misrepresentation need not prevent convergence to a Lindahl 
allocation. 
In the Lindahl problem, each'state législature maximizes its utility 
subject to a given share of the total cost of agricultural research 
activity, 6^. These cost shares sum to unity so that the full cost of 
(public) research is covered. The representative state legislature is 
assumed to choose y^  and Q^ , which is the community provision of 
agricultural research: 
Max U (yl.ql; E^ ) 
(yi.Qi) 
subject to - P^y^ + , 
9^  - qV . (II.8) 
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where 6^  is the i-th state's share of the total cost (P^Q^) of agricultural 
research for the region; are the state revenues of the state 
legislature, and P^ and Pq are prices of the private good and agricultural 
research, respectively. 
The FOC (Appendix A) can be written as 
MRS^  - flpq / Py . i-1 n (II.9) 
Let the solution to (II.9) be and Because the aggregate level of 
the public good at the equilibrium is the same, we can sum over all the n 
states. This gives 
Equation (11.10) is the Samuelson condition for Pareto optimal provision of 
a public good, since Z g •» 1. This then implies that a Lindahl 
i-1 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
By imposing the condition that the bordered Hessian determinant, |H | ,  
is strictly positive we can transform the FOCs via the Implicit Function 
theorem into the following reduced-form demand equations for y and Q: 
y^  ^- yi(li, giPq, Py: E^ ), i-1 n 
qil - Qi(ii, (?^ Pq, Py: e^ ). i-i n (ii.ii) 
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The Llndahl demand for agricultural research depends on the state's income, 
the price of y and Q, the individual cost shares, and the environmental 
variable. Â Lindahl equilibrium is obtained when there exists a set of 
cost shares such that Equations (11.11) hold for each agent, and the 
aggregate amount of agricultural research demanded is the same; that is 
qil-...- Q^ -^. . ... - Q"^. 
C. Impure Public Good Models 
In the models that we have considered in part A above, agricultural 
research is modeled as a pure public good. This implies that the benefits 
that flow from this good are, not even in any partial sense, excludable to 
any one state. This is a somewhat unreal representation, and as critics 
such as Margolis (1955) point out it is difficult to find real-life 
situation that fits the pure public goods model completely. The pure model 
has a relatively simple structure. When a state legislature increases its 
contribution to the public good by a unit, then each and every state's 
consumption of the public good rises by the same amount. Thus, the only 
characteristic that distinguishes the contributor from the other agents is 
the corresponding reduction in the consumption of the private good, given 
the budget constraint. However, Cornes and Sandler (1986, p. 113) note 
that, "It is not the purity of the model that accounts for its simplicity 
and for its inadequacy as a description of many real phenomena, but rather 
the presence of only one public good." Thus any externality situation can 
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be modeled as one involving public goods without changing the essence of 
the Samuelson model. 
In recent years, work in the field of public goods has focussed on 
extending the pure public good model to account for cases where the 
contributor to the public good derives benefits from the use of the public 
good that are exclusive to her. Thus giving to charity, which has for long 
been considered a pure public activity, has now been modeled differently. 
The pure public approach implies that as the number of potential donors 
increases, a utility-maximizing agent will not give to charity. Yet, we 
find that a considerable amount of charitable activity exists. Andreoni 
(1988) models charity as an impure public good, calling it impure altruism. 
He contends that when agents donate to privately provided public good they 
gain utility not only from an increase in the provision of the public good 
but also from the act of giving referred to as the "warm glow". Posnett 
and Sandler (1986) model charitable activity as a joint-supply model in 
which donating to charity is tied-in with the purchase of a private good. 
Thus joint-supply turns out, in their model, to be an effective fund-
raising technique when private and public goods are Hicksian complements. 
Defense expenditures, considered to be one of the few examples of a pure 
public good, are now modeled as an impure public good (see Murdoch and 
Sandler 1982, 1984, and 1986). 
Extensions of the pure public good model are considered next. The 
first model is the joint-product model. Then we will discuss the joint-
use model that was first developed by Oakland (1969). 
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1. Nash-Coumot iolnt product model 
Under this specification, an input produces goods having public and 
private characteristics. This model can refute, in some instances, the 
basic proposition that follows from the pure model; when the community size 
increases, free riding and the associated suboptimality also increase 
(Cornes and Sandler 1984a). In particular, the joint product model shows 
that the consumption relationship of the jointly produced outputs 
influences the departure of Nash equilibria from optimality and the slope 
of the reaction paths. When the jointly produced goods are complements in 
the Hicksian sense, an increase in the provision of the public input by one 
state may raise the contribution of the other states (Cornes and Sandler 
1984a). 
The formulation of the joint product model here directly follows the 
one used in Comes and Sandler (1984a). We assume that the state 
legislatures provide the private final good y and the input agricultural 
research activity q. Each unit of the private good y gives rise to a unit 
of private good y. This commodity produces no other characteristic for 
this or any other state and hence is considered private. Agricultural 
research represented by q^  produces two final goods or characteristics - x 
and Z. A simple (but arbitrary) transformation function which relates q^  
to and is: 
- gi(qi) , ( 11 .12 )  
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- hi(ql) (11.13) 
where the function and hj^ are assumed to be twice continuously 
differentiable and concave, and g^  and h^ are positive. We define the 
total public good available to the i-th state, Z^, as the summation of the 
public good provided by all the n states, i.e., 
Zf - zi + zi ' (I: 14 
where is the public good provided by the other n-1 states. The level 
of Z^  can also be related through a production function to the amount of 
research activity by the other states Q as: 
Z^ - m(ql) . (11.15) 
Thus, Z^ , is a function of aggregate research activity of all the n-1 
states. Any state i can enjoy the public good produced from agricultural 
research (Z^ ) without diminishing any other state's consumption. 
Each state legislature's preferences are defined over three goods x, y 
and Z and the environmental variable E. The utility function of state 
legislature i, which satisfies all the regularity constraints imposed 
earlier, may be represented as follows: 
- U^(yi, Z^ ; E^). ( 1 1 . 1 6 )  
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where a) is a private good, 
b) is the private good produced by agricultural research, 
c) is the pure public good produced by agricultural research, 
in the aggregate. 
State i is assumed to face a budget constraint of the form 
- Pyyl + Pqql . (11.17) 
Under the Nash perspective, each state legislature maximizes utility by 
choosing y and q, taking everything else as exogenous. 
The utility function in (11.16) can also be represented in terms of 
y^, q^, and by substituting in for x^ and Z^, via Equations (11.12) to 
(11.15). This allows utility to be stated as a function of y, the private 
good and q, agricultural research activity: 
u"- - U^ (yl,xl,zl;Ei) - U^ [y^ , gj^ (q^ ) .h^ (q^ )+ m(Q^  ),E^ ]. (11.18) 
Thus, Equation (11.18) establishes a link between the final goods space and 
the purchased goods space. 
We can relate the two spaces by differentiating the utility function 
with respect to y^  and q^  and expressing it as marginal rates of 
substitution. We obtain, 
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(11.19) 
or, 
- Bi + '•1 ( 11 .20 )  
Equation (11.20) shows that the MRS of q for y is a weighted sum of the MRS 
of X for y and the MRS of Z for y. The weights are the marginal product of 
the private and the pure public goods produced from research. They define 
the productivity of the i-th state to produce these two goods. 
To enable us to derive reduced-form demand equations, comparable to 
those derived under the Lindahl process, we redefine the representative 
state legislature's utility function so that it is stated in terms of the 
aggregate level of the public good. This follows from the relationship 
research activity. Thus, the Nash problem may be represented as follows: 
( 1 1 . 2 1 )  
where is the i-th state legislature's choice of aggregate level of 
Max 
(yi.Qi) 
U^[yi, gi(Q^ - Q^), hi(Qi- Q^)+ m(Q^ ), E^] 
subject to - I^ + PqQ^  - P^y^ + 
, y > 0 . ( 1 1 . 2 2 )  
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The FOCs of (11.22), as derived in Appendix A, can be expressed as 
g'i MRS^ y + h'i MRS^ y - Pq / Py. i-1 n (11.23) 
Equation 11.23 implies that state i will provide goods to the point 
where the weighted sum of the MRS between x and y and the MRS between Z and 
y is equal to the price ratio for Q and y. Let the solution be denoted as 
Qj^ ; this a vector of equilibrium quantities of y^ 's and Q^ 's that satisfy 
Equation (11.23) for all the states in a region. The weights g'^  and h'j^  
are the change in the goods between x and Z as q is varied. If g'j^  is 
greater than hthen relatively more private good is produced from a unit 
of q; and the marginal rate of substitution between x and y is given more 
weight. For applied research activity private good is likely to have 
greater weight and this may be the reason that a positive quantity of 
applied research is provided by the states. 
From the perspective of policy makers, it is important to know the 
determinants of demand for agricultural research. By changing the policy 
parameters, governments can influence demand. The reduced-form demand 
equations is derived, using the Implicit Function Theorem and by 
restricting the associated bordered Hessian determinant of the first-order 
conditions to be positive definite. A general specification of the demand 
functions for y^ and is: 
Yjp - (pl, PQ ,Py. Q^ : E^ , g'i, h'i, m'), i-1 n 
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Qjp - (F^ , PQ ,PY, Q^ : E^. g'i, h'i, m'). i-1 n (11.24) 
Specific demand functions can be obtained by imposing some structure on the 
utility function. With joint products, a state's demand for agricultural 
research depends on the prices, full income, the amount of spillins, 
environmental variable, and the technological parameters, Spillins enter 
the demand function twice; once explicitly, as Q , and once through the 
full income term F . The inclusion of the spillin term (Q ) implies that 
the private good(s) derived from agricultural research are important 
• i determinants of demand for the state legislatures. A change in Q affects 
the level of full income and the mix between pure and private agricultural 
research, since no private research is obtained from Q . Only an increase 
in the state's own research activities will cause an increase in private 
—i 
agricultural research output, x. The appearance of spillins as Q also 
implies that the neutrality theorem does not extend to the case of joint 
products; that is, a redistribution of income between the contributors will 
affect the Nash-Cournot equilibrium choice. A transfer of income, 
compensated by an equivalent transfer of the public good, will change 
equilibrium levels because private research output would remain 
uncompensated. When there are no private goods to be obtained from 
agricultural research, spillins enter the demand function only through the 
full income term and a redistribution of income does not affect Nash 
equilibrium (Warr, 1983; Cornes and Sandler, 1985; Bergstrom, Blume, and 
Varian, 1986). 
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The other variables in the demand function, namely the productivity 
factors, measure the marginal productivity of the i-th state, and other 
states (through m') in producing the private and public research outputs. 
However, it is difficult to quantify these factors and hence cannot be used 
in the empirical analysis. 
2. Pareto optimal joint product model 
A state's optimal quantity of public research determined by Nash 
behavior may not be optimal from a national perspective. The Pareto-
optimal quantity would be that quantity which takes into account the public 
benefit accruing to all the states from the production by any one state. 
The Pareto-optimizing problem is set up as a maximization of state i's 
utility subject to every other state obtaining a given utility level, as 
well as the aggregate budget constraint. The problem may be written as: 
The FOCs associated with (11.25), derived in Appendix A, can be written as: 
Max , U^[y^, gi(q^), hi(q^) +s h^ q^ ), E^] 
(yi.qi) j/i J 
n 
uj [y j,gj(q j),hj(q j )+  Z hk(qk), E^] ^  , for all j/i, i,j-l n 
(11 .25 )  
( 1 1 . 2 6 )  
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The amount of Z provided under the Nash solution is less than the 
Pareto-optimum. In the Nash solution of the same problem, agents engaged 
in a self-interested utility maximization, do not take into account the 
benefits to the other agents from their own demand of agricultural 
research. Hence, the Nash solution cannot be a societal equilibrium. 
Condition (11.26) shows that the sum of every state's marginal rate of 
substitution between the public good and the private good should be 
considered in order for agricultural research to be supplied optimally from 
a national perspective. Let the solution to the Pareto problem be denoted 
1* 
by Q ; a vector of quantities of the private good, y, and the public 
JP 
input agricultural research, Q, that satisfies Equation (11.26). As 
discussed earlier, Nash demand for public goods is less than the optimal 
(Pareto) demand because of the possibility of free riding. However, the 
presence of private aspects from the provision of a public good increases 
the Nash provision levels from the Nash levels reached without these 
corresponding private aspects. Under the Lindahl process, as we show 
below, a Pareto-optimal solution can be achieved by calling out state tax 
shares. 
3. Lindahl joint product model 
When agricultural research produces joint products, the Lindahl 
problem can be depicted such that a state legislature chooses the aggregate 
level of agricultural research activity, given the cost share. This is 
similar to the pure public good case except for the complexity caused by 
the joint product relationships. Let, 
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- RI(QL) , - DR /^DQJ^  > 0 , 
and Z - G(Q^) , G' - dG/dQ^ > 0 , 
and, in addition, the functions Rj and G are concave. The i-th state 
legislature chooses y and Q so as to maximize utility: 
Max U^[y^, Ri(Q^), G(Q^), E^] 
(YI.QI) 
subject to - P^y^ + , 
9^ - . (11.27) 
The FOCs (Appendix A) imply the following: 
R^MRS^y + G'MRS^^ - gipq / Py . i=l n (11.28) 
At a Lindahl equilibrium, the cost shares sum to one, hence we can sum 
over all the states at the equilibrium on both sides of (11.28) and obtain 
the Pareto-optimal result, 
The Lindahl process is a cooperative game which induces all agents to 
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Internalize their benefits. This is referred to as the "privatizing" 
effect (Murdoch and Sandler, 1986). It is this "privatizing" effect that 
makes the Lindahl process Fareto-optimal. By imposing the condition of a 
non-zero determinant on the bordered Hessian, the Lindahl demand functions 
are: 
- y^ (I^. Py: E^. G', R'i) , i-1 n 
(I_, glpq, Py: E^, G', R'i) . i-1 n (11.30) 
The general form of these demand functions does not differ from those 
derived under the pure public good model. As in the earlier case, no 
structure can be Imposed on these technical factors. Using a specific 
utility function will, however, allow one to ascertain the productivity 
factors G', and R'^. The existence of joint-products does not change, in 
the general specification of the demand function, the exogenous factors 
that affect demand for agricultural research. 
4. Nash-Coumot •joint-use good model 
The model that we are going" to present next follows closely the model 
developed in Oakland (1969). Such a specification defines the conditions 
for a Nash-Coumot equilibrium for collectively consumed goods for which 
the aggregate level of provision is fixed for agents providing the good. 
These goods were called joint-goods by Oakland. The jointness in 
consumption of these goods, like other impure public goods, is not 
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complete. However, the distinguishing characteristic of these goods is the 
fixed aggregate level of the public good. This could be due to allocation 
of a given amount of funds for that public activity; or the quantity of the 
good Itself is fixed, as in some natural resource. In other cases of 
public goods, analyzed here or elsewhere in literature, the utility-
maximizing problem of the i-th agent can always be defined as choice over 
the aggregate level of the public good. Oakland, though introducing this 
concept of goods, failed to include the fixed aggregate level constraint in 
his derivation of the equilibrium conditions. The additional constraint of 
fixed aggregate level leads to vastly different normative conclusions, as 
will be shown in the following section. 
We first present Oakland's definition of joint-goods before we 
formalize our model. A collection of goods which obey the 
transformation function 
Q - Z QI 
i-1 
constitute a joint-good if for at least one pair of states s, 1, and at 
least one use i, 
5U®/5Q  ^ / 0 , / 0 , 
S I 
where U and U are utility functions of s and i, respectively. Private 
S i. 
goods do not satisfy the conditions for a joint-good because fiU /5Q - 0 
for all s / i. That is, consumption by the s-th state of Q does not in 
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any way affect the utility of the i-th state legislature. In the case of 
pure public goods, on the other hand, for every state legislature the 
i " i 
utility function can be represented as U*' (Q) , for all j , where Q - S , 
i—1 
A change in the provision of Q by the i-th state will affect every other 
state. 
A note on semantics is in order before we formally set-up the model. 
We refer to the model that follows as the joint-use model whereas Oakland 
(1969) called it a joint-goods model. We choose to label it differently 
because we obtain results for the Nash-Cournot model that do not coincide 
with those obtained by Oakland, and furthermore we augment Oakland's model 
at a later stage by introducing joint-products along-with joint-use. We do 
not have a Lindahl specification under joint-use because the aggregate 
level of the activity is a parameter, given the definition of joint-use. 
In the Lindahl model, by construction, the various agents cooperate to 
decide the aggregate level of the public good that they would like to 
provide. In the joint-use model, on the other hand, the aggregate level of 
the public good is not a choice variable for the agents. 
The basic assumption that distinguishes the joint-use model from the 
other public goods model (pure and impure) is that the aggregate level of 
the public good activity is given for the group of states. In our model, 
the feasible level of agricultural research activity is, then a parameter 
for each state legislature. Thus, each state maximizes utility subject to 
this additional constraint. For each unit of the joint-use good demanded, 
a state loses the spillins that could have resulted from the other states' 
use of the joint-use good. There are, however, two parts to the spillins 
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lost. One is due to a reduction in the amount of free-riding due to one's 
own contribution and is similar to the one that occurs in the other public 
goods model. The second part of spillins lost is due to the fact that the 
total amount of the public good is fixed. By demanding one unit of the 
good, the representative state, thus, leaves one unit less for the other 
states. There are, therefore, two forces that keep a state legislature 
from demanding the joint-use good. There is the possibility that, at the 
limit, no state will demand any agricultural research and wait for every 
other state to provide the good. This, however, will not happen because 
the jointness in consumption is not complete; there are some benefits of 
research that are exclusive to the state which is undertaking the research. 
We can express the i-th state legislature's utility function as 
- USY\ QS...Q") 
where y^ is the consumption of the private good by the i-th state and is 
the joint-use good allocated to the i-th state. As before, we assume the 
representative state's utility function satisfies all the regularity 
constraints. Under the Nash model, we make the usual zero conjecture 
assumption. Summarizing the i-th state's maximization problem as 
Max U^(y^, Q^,...Q", E^) 
subject to - P^y^ + PQQ^' 
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(11.31) 
where state 1 maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint and the 
joint-use good constraint. In the joint-use constraint Q is the given 
level of agricultural research activity for the region. We could also 
interpret Q as the fixed amount of research money available which has to be 
shared among the various states. The joint-use constraint simply asserts 
that all the various uses (i.e., allocations) of the joint-use good should 
sum to the total amount available of the good. We can rewrite the joint-
use constraint as 
states except the i-th state. It reflects the amount left over for the 
other states to use once the i-th state has made its optimal choice. We 
solve the maximization problem in Appendix A. The FOCs that follow can be 
written in terms of marginal valuations as 
— i 4 
Q - Q - S QJ 
j/i 
— I 
where Q represents the amount of the joint-use good available to all 
MRSQIY - MRSQ_iy Pq /Py . i-1 n (11.32) 
The FOC in (11.32) implies that every state demands the joint-use good 
(Q J^). where Qj^ is a vector of y's and Q's that satisfy the necessary 
conditions given by Equation (11.32). These optimizing levels are so 
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chosen so as to equate to the price ratio the difference of its marginal 
valuation of the joint-use good and the marginal valuation of the spillins 
lost from research not provided by the other states. A comparison with the 
FOCs obtained under the pure public good model (Equation II.6) shows that 
the amount equated to the relative price ratio is smaller, if the marginal 
valuation of the spillins is positive. In the pure public good case, under 
Nash assumptions, there is no interrelation between the units demanded by 
the i-th state and the other n-1 states. In the joint-use case, i-th 
state's demand for research is linked to demand of the other states through 
the fixed aggregate level constraint - one more unit of agricultural 
research funds for i-th state implies one less unit for the other n-1 
states. The effect of fixed aggregate level of the public good is explored 
in further detail in the following paragraphs. 
By imposing the additional condition that the bordered Hessian 
associated with the above maximization is strictly positive, we can write 
the reduced-form demand equations as: 
YJU - Y^ (I^, PQ, PY: Q. .. .Q",E^), i-I n 
Qj" - (I^, PQ, PY: Q.Q^ E^). i-1 n (11.33) 
The equilibrium amount of agricultural research demanded by state i under 
Joint-use specification is thus a function of the prices, income, the fixed 
level of the joint-use good, and the (equilibrium) level of demand of all 
the other n-1 agents. The demand of the other agents captures the spill 
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term for the i-th state. Since the spill term does not appear as part of 
Income, I.e., as full Income, the neutrality theorem can not be applied to 
this model. Similar to other impure specifications in which jointness in 
consumption is not complete, transfers of income between agents can not be 
compensated fully by corresponding changes in public godd provision levels. 
5. Effect of foint-use constraint on demand for research 
It would be Interesting to analyze the effect of the additional joint-
use constraint on the behavioral rules of the agents. This can be done by 
contrasting the optimal decision rule with and without the joint-use 
constraint. The utility function defined for the joint-use case is similar 
to that for general externality. Hence a comparison of the necessary 
conditions in these two cases will bring out clearly the effect of having 
the aggregate quantity of the public good as a parameter. 
It has for long been established that in the presence of 
externalities, in a market economy, the independent adjustment mechanism 
produces non-Pareto optimal allocations (see for example Cornes and 
Sandler, 1986). Typically, state legislatures make their optimal decisions 
based on their personal marginal valuations whereas Pareto optimality 
requires otherwise. We can make a similar comparison when the good causing 
the externality is a joint-use good. Our interest then is to ascertain if 
the degree of suboptlmallty changes with this different specification. The 
i-th state's utility function in the presence of externalities is: 
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Max U^[ y^, Q^,...q" ] 
(YI.QI) 
where the consumption of good Q by the 1-th state and by all the other n-1 
states enters the utility function of the 1-th state. Maximizing this 
utility function subject to the standard budget constraint will yield the 
following FOCs: 
MRSqiy - Pq /Py , i-1 n (11.34) 
Let the optimal quantity associated with (11.34) be denoted as and y \  
In contrast, the Pareto allocation requires the fulfillment of the follow­
ing FOC: 
1 " 1 
MRSqiy + - Pq /Py , i,j - 1 n (11.35) 
Solving (11.35) at the Nash demands and y^ yields 
IMRSQIY - FQ /PYL " • <"•3') 
Since {MRS^j^y, - Pq /P^} - 0 (from 11.34), Equation (11.36) implies that 
the Pareto FOC solved at the Nash demand is positive. That is, the point 
of a Pareto maximum which requires the FOC to be zero, has still not been 
attained at the Nash demand level of and y\ Given our assumption of 
quaslconcave preferences this means that the Pareto optimal provision 
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levels are higher than the Nash levels. That is, 
_i „i* 
^ X , (11.37) 
i* 
where Q ^  is the Pareto efficient demand for the good. Carrying out a 
similar comparison with a joint-use good will enable us to relate the Nash 
demands with and without the joint-use constraint and contrast it to the 
Pareto optimal demand. The Pareto-optimal conditions, as we have seen 
earlier, remain the same except that they have to hold for each use of the 
joint good. That is, 
" i 
S MRS^iy - PQ /Py, i - 1,2 n (11.38) 
i* 
The solution to the above, Q ^  is same as in the simple externality model. 
Rewriting the FOC for the joint-use good; 
MRSQIY - MRS^ _LY - PQ/PY (11.39) 
Evaluating (11.39), the Nash FOC for joint-use, at the optimal Nash demand 
under externalities and y^ we get: 
( MRSqiy - Pp /Py ) - MRS^_iy < 0 , (11.40) 
since, at the equilibrium demands, and y^, the first term equals zero, 
from (11.34) and we assume the i-th state to have a positive marginal 
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valuation of the spllllns (I.e., MRSp_j^y > 0). Condition (11.40) Implies 
that the 1-th state Is not at a point of maximum when it demands Q^. 
Further, since (11.40) Is negative It Implies that the state has surpassed 
the optimum demand level. This follows again from the assumption of a 
quaslconcave utility function. Thus optimal demand under the joint-use 
model Qcan be related to that under externalities as: 
"JU < 'i • 
Using (11.37) and (11.41) we can write : 
.in _ QJU < 0% < Q X (11.42) 
Equation (11.42) allows us to conclude that with the additional joint-
use constraint the degree of suboptimality increases. A state while making 
the optimal choice has to appraise the benefits it will lose by demanding 
some given amount of the joint-use good. This is peculiar to the joint-
use specification primarily because the aggregate level of the good is a 
parameter. In the other models of public goods previously considered, the 
aggregate level of the public good is not a given quantity to the utility-
maximizing state. State legislatures, as we have shown, can be depicted as 
making their choice over the aggregate amount of the public good. The 
additional constraint of given amount of the aggregate level of the public 
good increases the degree of suboptimality in the joint-use model. 
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The above analysis of the optimal decision rule when the public good 
is a joint-use good demonstrates that the marginal valuation of the 
spillins plays a major role in distorting each state's optimal solution 
away from the Pareto-optimal one. Comparing it to the case of general 
externality we find that marginal valuation of the spillins, if positive, 
leads each state to demand fewer units of the good. Given that the 
independent solution under externality is already suboptimal, we conclude 
that jointness in consumption increases the suboptimality. 
6. Joint-use model with joint products 
The joint-use specification as detailed above seems to conform most 
closely to the situation encountered for the federal funding of agricul­
tural research projects. Decision regarding the amount of funds to be 
allocated to aggregate agricultural research activity is made at an earlier 
stage and is exogenous to the optimization process involving individual 
state's decision on research. Thus, the federal budget is a parameter for 
all the participating states. Given this, each state determines how much 
to demand out of the fixed budget. A deciding factor, of course, is their 
individual valuation of the spillins. Up to this point, however, we have 
implicitly assumed that the research produced is pure public. Once the 
research has been produced, it can be used by all the states equally. We 
can revise this assumption to allow for private and public characteristics 
to stem from each unit of research. This is the joint-product model that 
we have discussed earlier. Now along with jointness in production we 
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assume that the marketed good Is a joint-use good as well. 
The model that follows is similar to the earlier joint-product 
specification. Hence, most of the relations will simply be stated and not 
explained in detail. The resulting FOCs and the reduced-form equations 
will show the effects of the additional joint-use constraint. 
The i-th state's maximization problem may be stated as follows: 
Max ^ - U^(yl, gi(Q^), hjCQ^) + m(Q^), E^) (yi.qi) 
subject to - P^y^ + PqQ^ 
N I 
Q - S Q . (11.43) 
i—l 
We can rewrite the joint-use constraint as: 
i Q - Q - Q , 
and substitute this into the utility function in the production of the 
-i 
public good ( Z ) to get the utility function as: 
U^(yl, gi(Q^), hi(ql) + m(Q - qf), E^). (11.44) 
Maximizing (11.44) with respect to the budget constraint, gives the 
following FOCs: 
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g'i MRS^y + (h'i - m') MRgly - Pg / Py , i-1 n. (11.45) 
The FOCs show that the 1-th state equates to the price ratio its 
weighted marginal valuation of the private and public aspects of research. 
The private characteristic resulting from research activity is weighted by 
the marginal product of the i-th state. The public aspect is weighted by 
the difference in the marginal productivity of the i-th state and the other 
n-1 states. 
In this model, we have assumed all states except i to have the same 
aggregate production function, m(Q ) and hence an aggregate productivity 
coefficient. Relative productivity plays a major role in the decision 
process. Productivity of the other state(s) is important because decisions 
are being made under 'a given level of public good' constraint. 
If we assume the bordered Hessian determinant associated with the 
above maximization to be positive definite, then the reduced-form equations 
implied by the FOCs are: 
Y "^ - PQ .PY, Q; E^, G'^, H'^, m') i-I n 
PQ .Py, Q: E^, g'i, h'i, m' ) i=l n (11.46) 
For joint products, i-th state's Nash-Cournot demand for agricultural 
research, when it is a joint-use good, depends on prices, income, the 
exogenous level of aggregate public good, the environmental variable, and 
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the technology parameters. Since these technology parameters can not be 
quantified for a general specification, demand function for joint-use 
goods, with or without joint products, will be identical in an empirical 
description of these models. However, if we impose some structure on the 
production functions we will be able to distinguish between the two 
specifications. 
D. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have derived the reduced-form demand functions for 
agricultural research when it is alternately modeled as a pure public good 
and an impure public good. The various models and their associated first-
order conditions and demand functions are summarized in Table II.1. The 
first column in Table 4 lists the utility function and the constraints 
associated with the maximization process for the specific model being 
considered. The second column lists the first-order conditions obtained 
from this maximization; and the third column lists the related reduced-
form demand function of this model. The first set of models presented in 
the Table are the pure public good representations for the Nash-Cournot and 
the Lindahl allocation schemes. The second set of models belong to the 
general specification of impure public goods. Under this specification, 
the Nash-Cournot and Lindahl allocative behavior is studied for the joint 
product model, and compared to the Pareto allocation. The other impure 
specification presented is the Nash-Cournot joint-use model - with and 
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without joint products. 
A cursory look at Table 4 shows how the general demand functions 
vary across models. The joint product model under the Nash-Cournot scheme 
includes full income, prices, spillins, and the environmental variable. 
The Lindahl scheme, on the other hand, includes income, prices, the tax 
share, and the environmental variable. Also, the determinants of the pure 
public good specification form a subset of the determinants of the joint 
product model. Hence, the pure public good model "nests" within the joint 
product model. With the aggregate level of public good fixed, as in the 
joint-use model, the spillin variable is replaced by this fixed aggregate 
level parameter. 
The models discussed in this chapter form a wide array, stretching 
from the pure public to the impure public good specification, and from 
cooperative to noncooperative behavior. The next step would be to 
distinguish between the various models using econometric techniques. Since 
many models have been examined analytically, only a subset of these are 
chosen to be fitted empirically. Hence, for empirical purposes, the joint 
product specification for Nash-Cournot and Lindahl allocation schemes is 
fitted. As discussed earlier, the pure public specification "nests" within 
the joint product specification. Thus, fitting the joint product 
specification implicitly tests for the pure public good specification. The 
empirical testing of the joint-use model is left for future research. 
The next chapter describes the data and empirical specifications of 
the models that are to be fitted. The construction of variables used in 
the analysis is described and the problems related to the empirical 
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analysis are investigated. The results of the empirical analysis are 
presented in Chapter IV, 
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Table 4. Summary of the models analyzed 
Model First-Order Demand 
Conditions Function 
I; Pure Public 
Good Specification 
1. Nash-Cournot 
UL(YL,QL,EI) MRS^  - QI(FL,PQ,PY,EI) 
s.t. 
F^ -PYY +^PQQ  ^
s.t. 
LI-PYYL+EIPQQI 
II; Impure Public 
Good Specification 
A, Joint Product 
lA. Nash-Cournot 
TIR„I „ /NI.MI 
2. Lindahl 
NI RI\ MTIC i  ul(yl,Qi.El) MRS i - «/q Q^(I^,0%,P E^) 
Qy PQ ^ 
u [y ,gi(Q -Q ), QIFFI.PQ.PY.QI, 
hi(Qi-Qi)+m(Qi),Ei] g',h',m'.E^). 
s.t. F^-P y^+PnQ^. 
(g'MRS^ + h'MRS^ - Pn) 
i xy zy 
y 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
Model First-Order Demand 
Conditions Function 
2A. Lindahl 
UI[YL,RI(QL), R' MRS^  + G'MRS^  Q^D .^E^ PO.PV. 
R'i.G.EÏ). 
S.T. I^ -PYY +^E^ PQQ  ^ _ E^ PQ 
"Y 
B. Joint-Use 
IB. Nash-Cournot 
Joint-Use 
UI(YL,Q',...,QL,...,Q"'EL) MRS^ I - MRS^  , Q^D .^PQ.PY.Q.E^ ) 
. . . • Q y Q-iy 
s.t. I^-Pyy^+PqQ^ 
Q - 2 
i-1 
2B: Nash-Courno t 
Joint-Use 
and Joint Product 
U^[y^.gl(Q^). ^ MR^+ (h' - m')MRS^ Q^CI^.Pq.Py.Q, 
zy 
,EI) 
HI(QI)+M(QI),EI] - PQ 
s.t. li-Pyyi+PqQi ^ 
Q-I - Q-QI 
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III. THE ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
This chapter describes the empirical specification of the reduced-
form demand functions derived in the previous chapter. These demand 
functions are fitted using U.S. data from the 48 contiguous states. State 
legislative decisions are analyzed under the Nash-Coumot allocation 
equilibrium and the Lindahl equilibrium. A number of alternative models of 
decision-making were analyzed in Chapter II. For empirical purposes, 
however, only the joint product specification is fitted, for both the Nash-
Cournot and the Lindahl equilibrium. The joint product specification is 
fitted mainly for two reasons; first, the pure public good model "nests" in 
the more general joint product model, hence fitting the joint product model 
implies testing for the pure public specification as well. Secondly, 
empirical analysis of the joint-use model requires data on funds allocated 
to various regions (regions defined in terms of geoclimate considerations). 
Data on agricultural research is not so well disaggregated to allow one to 
identify funds allocated to the various regions for research. Hence, 
empirical testing of the joint-use model cannot be undertaken at this time. 
The first section of this chapter lays out the empirical specification 
of the joint product model under the Nash-Cournot and the Lindahl 
equilibrium concepts. Empirical measures of the various factors that 
affect demand for research are described. We also look at the related 
problems of empirical specification and how they can be eliminated. 
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Finally, the data sources and a brief description of the variables is 
given. 
A. Econometric Models 
1. Nash-Cournot Models 
Two versions of the Nash-Cournot models of state government decisions 
on demand for agricultural research are considered. They are the pure 
public goods model which has a general aggregate demand function of 
Equation (II.7) and the joint products model which has the general 
specification in Equation (11.24). 
Some of the differences in arriving at an empirical specification of 
Nash-Cournot models can be seen by considering the following demand 
equation for agricultural research: 
In - a^. + a, . In P + a„. In pf + a,. In SPlLLf + ef (III.l) 
t Oi li t 2i It 3i It It 
where is the total quantity of public agricultural rsearch demanded by 
all states i (i-1 n,.) in region r (r-1 R) in year t (t-l,...,T), 
is the relative price of public agricultural research in t, is full 
income of state i in region r in year t, and SPILL^^ is the potential 
spillin of public agricultural research from other states in region r to 
state i during t; and ef^ is a random error term. The a^^s are the unknown 
coefficients. 
The issues involved in the empirical specification of these models are 
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(i) the functional form, (ii) the randomness of full income (F^^) and the 
spillin (SPILL^^) variables and their correlation with e^^, and (iii) 
autocorrelation of ef^s. Although a little experimenting was done with a 
strictly linear form, the log-linear form generally performed better. It 
has estimated coefficients that are elasticities and it facilitates 
performing some of the tests between models. 
To see the randomness and the potential simultaneity in Equation 
r r r (III.l), we examine more carefully the definitions of Q^, SPILL^^, and 
The total quantity of research demanded in region r is 
Qt - 2% sit ' (::: 
where q^^ is the quantity demanded by state i in region r during year t. 
The research available for potentially spilling into state i in region r 
during year t is 
SPILLf = S^ qf . (III.3) 
it It 
The full income of state i in region r is 
 ^"'"-It -
where I^^ is the government revenue of state i in region r during year t. 
Now Equations (III.2), (III.3), and (III.4) contain common variables; they 
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are s. These q^ s are the quantities of research demanded by the state 
it it 
in region r. They contain a random component which is the primary source 
1 0  T V  
of randomness for and imparts randomness to SPILL^^ and Thus, 
SPILL^^ and F^^ cannot be taken as exogenous in Equation (III.l). This is 
the classic multi-agent problem in which each state demand function 
represents a separate response function, but the outcome of each state is 
constrained by the equilibrium condition that the total level of 
agricultural research for the region be the same for all the states in the 
rgion. This interdependence introduces a randomness in the variables 
SPILL^^ and on the right-hand side of the demand equation. 
Specifically, SPILL^^ and F^^ are correlated with e^^. 
An instrumental variable solution to the simultaneity problem is 
contained in the following model: 
In 4. In 4. In In SPILL^^ + (III.5) 
in SPILL^^ - in 1^^ + f,l In P, + (III.6) 
- 0+ 1-1 "lie ^ "2 ^ 'it 
where e^^, and are random disturbance terms. Here the instruments 
used to predict SPILLf^ and Ff^ are the government revenues of all the 
states in the region (I^^^ and the relative price of agricultural research 
(P ). This solution assumes that the In if s and In P are uncorrelated 
t It t 
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with 
When Equations (III.5), (III.6), and (III.7) are fitted to annual 
data, the random disturbance terms ef , w , and ç seem likely to be 
It it it 
autocorrelated. However, the assumption that is made here is that e^^ has 
a first-order autocorrelation process, e^^ - /'i®^^ ^ + u^^ where 
T r 2 2 
Eu^^ - 0, and E[u^^] - a . The possible autocorrelation of and 
will be ignored. The autocorrelation of these disturbances will not affect 
the consistency of the estimated parameters in the demand equation. 
The procedure for estimating Equations (III.5), (III.6) and (III.7) is 
as follows. First, a test of the null hypothesis that - 0 (vs y 0) 
is performed using the Durbin-Watson statistic. The Durbin-Watson test 
statistic is used to detect first-order autocorrelation. It is defined as 
Z ET 
t-1 
When the hypothesis is not rejected, then Equations (III.5), (III.6), and 
(III.7) are to be estimated by two-stage least squares. When the null 
hypothesis that - 0 is rejected, then Equation (III.5) is transformed as 
follows using the estimated value of p^, that is, p^: 
In - Pi In ^ - a^^d - p^) + a^^ (In - p^ In ) 
- '21 '1 1" T^-1 ' 
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^ r " r * 
+ (In SPILL^£ In SPILL^^_^) + , (III.8) 
* r " r 
where - e^^ - e^^ ^ . Thus, when p^ is significantly different 
from zero. Equations (III.6), (III.7) and (III.8) are fitted by two-stage 
least squares. 
We have some prior exceptation about the signs of the coefficients of 
the empirical demand function for public agricultural research. We except, 
based on economic theory, that the own-price elasticity of demand (a^^) is 
negative. Earlier studied on demand for agricultural research do not use 
any price data, hence there are no estimates from previous studied that 
will refute or support our results. However, economic theory would suggest 
own price effects to be negatively related to demand for that good. 
The full income elasticity of demand for public agricultural research 
could be positive or negative. Earlier studies do not use a public 
goods approach, hence their estimates on income elasticity are different 
from estimates obtained in this study. The estimates obtained here are 
elasticity measures on full income, which includes cash income and the 
level of spillins. Elasticity estimates from earlier studies measure the 
responsiveness to the cash income alone. Thus, these measures are partial 
measures compared to the elasticity measures obtained here. However, the 
earlier studies can give us some idea about the direction of this measure. 
Huffman and Miranowski (1981) and Evenson and Rose-Ackerman (1985) obtain 
positive income elasticities for demand for agricultural research. Based 
upon these studies, and the sign and magnitude of the spillin term which 
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makes the other part of the full income elasticity measure, we do except a 
positive income elasticity of demand for agricultural research. If this 
elasticity is positive then public agricultural research is a normal good. 
The coefficient on the spillln variable (a^^) is of special interest 
in the demand function. If it is significantly different from zero, then 
the joint product model of agricultural research provides a significantly 
better explanation of demand for public agricultural research by the states 
than the pure public good model of agricultural research. Crop research in 
particular seems to produce some goods that are specific to a state 
performing research. These are the private goods produced from research, 
as described in the theoretical model. The goods produced from livestock 
research seem to be less geoclimatic specific and hence are likely to spill 
more freely to other states. These are the public goods produced by 
agricultural research. Because this study aggregates crop and livestock 
research expenditures together, we expect the joint product model to be a 
better explanation of demand for agricultural research than the pure public 
good model, i.e., the expectation is that a^^ will be significantly 
different from zero. 
The sign of the spillin term depends on two parts as is explained 
below. The overall effect of change in spillins on demand may be split as: 
5 / S In SPlLLf - S qi / S In SPlLLf + 1 , 
t it t ' It 
Thus, the total effect of a change in spillins on demand for research 
depends on change in state's own demand for research plus 1. The first 
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I- Y  
part, 5 / 5 In SPILL^^ , is greater than minus 1 for normal goods 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1986). Therefore, the total effect will be positive 
if the private good produced by agricultural research is a normal good or 
if the public and private goods produced by input of public agricultural 
research are strong complements. 
2• Lindahl Model 
In Chapter II, Equation (11.11) is the general form of the demand 
function for public agricultural research under the Lindahl model. The 
empirical specification of this model is as follows: 
"C " ®01 + \ l  'IT +  ^ 'L' + 'IT 
(In P + In «5 ) - «Î. + i' In if + S* In P, + (III.10) 
t  It  U1 i l  It  1  C I t  
where 9 - q._ / Q is the share by state i of the total cost of 
it t ^it t 
public agricultural research in region r, and and are the random 
disturbance terms. 
The reasons for the particular empirical specification of the Lindahl 
model chosen in Equations (III.9) and (III.10) are basically the same as 
for the Nash-Cournot specification in Equations (III.5), (III.6) and 
(III.7). The log- linear model has estimated parameters that are 
elasticities and it facilitates some of the model testing that is carried 
X  X  
out later. The cost share is a function of and q^^^ which are random 
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and likely to be correlated with This is the reason for Equation 
(III.10) which uses In 1^^ and In as instruments to predict (In + In 
0^^) . Although the random disturbance terms and seem likely to be 
correlated in annual data, only is examined for autocorrelation, 
h t  - * i  'ÏT-I 
The procedure for estimating Equations (III.9) and (III.10) is as 
follows. First, a test of the null hypothesis that - 0 (vs 0) is 
performed. Where this hypothesis is not rejected, Equations (III.9) and 
(III.10) are estimated by two-stage least squares. When the null 
" k  
hypothesis that - 0 is rejected, then Equation (III.9) is transformed 
* * 
as follows, using the estimated value of p^, that is p^: 
In - p* In - a*^ (1 - p*) + a^^ (In I^^ - P* In I^ 
it-1) 
+ ( 1" Pt + 1" 'It - 1" Pt.l - 'I 1" 'It.l + "St 
Thus, when p^ is significantly different from zero. Equations (III.10) and 
(III.11) are fitted by two-stage least squares. 
The coefficients of demand are of primary interest. Based upon the 
empirical results reported by others, a^. is expected to be positive. 
Hence, agricultural research is a normal good. The coefficient a^^ is 
excepted to be negative. Holding constant, a high price is excepted to 
reduce the quantity of agricultural research that is demanded. Similarly, 
holding P^ constant, a large cost share is also expected to reduce the 
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amount of agricultural research demanded. The cost share term is what 
individualizes the price of agricultural research for each state in the 
Lindahl model. 
B. Distinguishing Between the Nash-Coumot and Lindahl Models 
Both the Nash-Cournot and Lindahl models provide possible explanations 
for state government decisions on public agricultural research. A 
reasonable question to ask is which model provides the best explanation. A 
natural approach to the testing of a particular specification of interest 
is to embed it in some general model in such a way that the former model 
can be derived from the latter by imposing a set of parametric 
restrictions. The adequacy of the tentatively entertained null model can 
then be assessed by checking whether these restrictions are consistent with 
sample data. The null hypothesis is accordingly identified with these 
parametric restrictions. 
However, in our case the alternative is fully specified and does not 
contain the null model as a special case; that is, it can not be derived 
from the null model by any parametric restrictions. This is because 
although Equations (III.5) and (III.9) have the same specification of the 
dependent variable, the regressors are different. Testing of such models 
is referred to in the literature as "nonnested" testing. Broadly speaking, 
two models are said to be nonnested if neither can be obtained from the 
other by the imposition of appropriate parametric restrictions or as a 
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limit of a suitable approximation (Pesaran 1987). Nonnested models can 
arise from differences in the underlying theoretical paradigms or from 
differences in the way a particular relationship suggested by economic 
theory is modelled. Examples of nonnested testing abound in the 
literature: money demand functions (McÂleer, Fisher and Volker, 1982), 
empirical models of exchange rate determination (Backus, 1984), Keynesian 
and new classical models of unemployment (Pesaran, 1982a). 
Many checks of model adequacy have been derived as Lagrange multiplier 
tests by viewing the model under scrutiny as being a special case of a more 
general specification. While it is clear that these checks are helpful, a 
poor choice of alternative hypothesis may lead to a low probability of 
rejecting an inadequate hypothesis. In such cases, it is necessary to 
check models against each other and use these competing models to provide 
information about each other (Hendry and Richard, 1983, Davidson et al., 
1978, Pesaran, 1982b). Tests of nonnested alternatives are, therefore, 
important. 
The two demand functions derived from the Nash and Lindahl 
specification are not nested (i.e., no one model is a more general 
specification of any other model), hence it is not possible to use common 
tests based on the F statistic or the liklihood ratio. It is possible, 
however, to test among these nonnested models by using the J-test suggested 
by Davidson and Mackinnon (1981). 
Davidson and Mackinnon consider the case of the single equation model, 
the truth of which we wish to determine. This represents our null 
hypothesis: 
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«0 = Xf f ) + ®0t (III.12) 
where y is the dependent variable, X is the matrix of independent 
variables, ^  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and e^^ is the error 
term which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The 
alternative model is posed as the alternative hypothesis: 
where S is a matrix of exogenous variables, ^ is a vector of parameters and 
e^^ is the error term which is independent and identically distributed. To 
test the alternative specification we construct a compound model that is à 
weighted average of the two competing models. That is : 
By itself this model is not very useful, since P, <t> , and 0 are not 
identifiable. Davidson and Mackinnon suggest that if <(> is replaced by its 
least squares estimate, the t-statistic on 0 is asymptotically N(0,1) when 
HO is true. This is called the J-test because y9 and ÎÎ are being estimated 
jointly. 
By combining Equations (III.5) and (III.9) together we can make a 
compound model for testing the Nash-Cournot specification in the following 
way: 
\ yt - 8(8%, * ) + eit (111.13) 
: y^ - (1-0) f( x^, f ) + n g(s^, 4> ) + (III.14) 
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In Q 
r 
- (1 - 0) + (1 - fl) In + a^^ ( 1- 0) In 
t 
+ a^^ (1 - n) SPILLj r+ n In . 
(III.15) 
it 
rL 
where In Q ^  is the predicted value from the Llndahl model obtained from 
fitting Equation (III.9) by least squares, and Q is the weight given to the 
predicted value from the Lindahl model. 
The above test assumes that the right-hand side variables are 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with errors of the model. They also assume 
that the errors are serially uncorrelated. Our demand models, however, 
exhibit contemporaneous correlation between the independent variables and 
the error term and also that the errors are serially correlated. 
These issues have been addressed in literature, though separetely. 
Davidson and Mackinnon (1981) address the issue of correlation between the 
right-hand side variables and the error term. They show how the test can 
be adapted to handle models estimated by two stage least squares. Assuming 
the two competing models to be linear, they show that if there exists a 
matrix of instruments with the usual properties then the two stage least 
squares J test involves estimating the combined model given in Equation 
(III.14) by two stage least squares. 
This test procedure assumes that both competing hypotheses specify the 
same set of instruments. This assumption is somewhat restrictive but is 
needed to identify the effect of different specifications. With different 
instruments the J test results might depend on which instruments were 
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associated with each hypotheses, rather than on the specification of HO and 
HI. 
The issue of testing alternative hypothesis for time-series data is 
developed in Bernake et al. (1988). Under HO, with a first-order 
autoregressive scheme. Equation (IV.1) becomes 
yt - Xt' f ) + ®ot ' 
where e^^ - p + 6^ , 
and is white noise. The equation for the compound model is 
Yt - P y^.i f(Xc " P Xt-l)' " S (2%, (III.16) 
* A A 
where g (Z^, ^ ) - g(Zj., ^ ) and ^ is the maximum liklihood estimator of <}> 
obtained from the following first-order autocorrelation transformed 
equation 
^t - "1 ft-i s(Zt - ^1 Zt-1' * ) + *1C ' 
We correct for autocorrelation in the estimation of <ft, but we did not 
use the autogressive structure to calculate the predicted value of 
^ A 
g (Z^, (f) ). The idea is to get efficiency in the estimation of but not 
to include the autoregressive structure in the prediction of g. This is 
because imposing the autoregressive structure to predict might result in a 
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significant estimate of O, and not reflect the true prediction of g as a 
function of its regressors. 
In our model, then, we bring together the modifications to the J test 
to account for the contemporaneous correlation between the errors and the 
regressors and the serial correlation of the errors. There are a number of 
ways in which the J statistic may be modified. We look at two possible 
methods. In the first method^ (called JI), the predicted value from the 
competing model is corrected for autocorrelation by the correlation 
coefficient of the other model. That is, if the first model has 
significant autocorrelation then all the regressors, including the 
predicted value from the competing model, are corrected for 
autocorrelation. In the second method^ (called JII), the predicted values 
are not corrected for autocorrelation. The results from JII will be 
presented here while those from JI will be presented in Appendix C. 
Thus for our case we make a combined model for the Nash-Cournot and 
the Lindahl models. There will be two such combined models. The first 
combined model retains the Nash-Cournot structure and test the predictive 
power of the Lindahl model. This is the specification given in Equation 
(III.15). In the second combined model, we retain the Lindahl structure 
and test the additional information provided by the Nash-Cournot model. 
With autocorrelation, however, the equation has to be redefined by 
^The methodology of this test grew out of discussions with Wayne Fuller, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
^This method is a result of discussions with Wallace Huffman, Todd 
Sandler, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, and James Murdoch, 
Auburn University, Montgomery, Alabama, respectively. 
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transforming the variables. The compound model, in the presence of 
correlated disturbances, becomes: 
Qt " + *11 (1 - 0)( 1 - p* (In Q^_^) 
a^^ (1 - a) (In - p* In ^ ) 
+ \I ( 1- (1" ^IT- ' I  ^T-I^ 
+ a^^d - n) (In SPILL^^^i ^^^^it-1 
+ a^^ 0 In , (III. 17) 
where is the predicted value of the autocorrelation coefficient. 
The J test, thus, consists of testing the hypothesis of the predicted 
values from the competing model. This procedure is outlined below. 
Hypothesis 1 
Maintain the Nash-Cournot joint product model. 
This hypothesis can be tested by the following linear restriction: 
Hlo • "'t - » . 
irL 
Hl^ : Q ^ / 0 , for each i. 
Under hypothesis 1, the predicted value from the Lindahl model should have 
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little statistical significance in the joint product model. Failure to 
reject HIQ provides support for Nash behavior. 
The methodology of the test is as follows: from the estimate of demand 
Equations (III.6) and (111,11) the predicted values of In is obtained 
from the Nash-Cournot and Lindahl models. Then the combined model is 
specified for each state in the region, which is a linear combinition of 
the the model to be tested and the predicted value from the other model. 
That is, the first combined model is a linear combinition of the Nash model 
and the predicted value from the Lindahl model; the second is the linear 
combinition of the Lindahl model and the predicted value from the Nash 
model. If significant autocorrelation is detected in the Nash model then 
rL 
all variables, except the predicted value from the Lindahl model Q ^, are 
corrected for autocorrelation and the equation is refitted. 
Hypothesis 2 
Maintain the Lindahl model. This specification can be tested by the 
following linear restriction: 
rN 
H2q : Q ^ - 0 , 
rN 
H2^ : Q ^ / 0 , for each i. 
Under hypothesis 2, we do not expect the predicted values of In from 
the Nash model to be significant. If the Lindahl model shows evidence of 
autocorrelation all the variables of the combined model are transformed. 
We present the results of the J test in the next chapter. Before 
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that, however, we present a brief description of the data and variables 
used in the estimation of these models. 
C. Data 
The empirical analysis uses annual U.S. data for the 48 contiguous 
states. Data were obtained primarily from USDA-CSRS reports and the 
Statistical Abstract (several years) of the United States. Variables 
specific to a certain model have been defined in section A while discussing 
the empirical specification of the models. In this section we define 
variables that are common to all the models analyzed in this chapter. 
3. Quantity of Agricultural Research 
The quantity of agricultural research is derived by dividing 
expenditures on research by the price for agricultural research. Thus, 
where 
q^ - Expenditure^ / , 
q^ - the quantity of state agriculture experiment station research 
undertaken by state i. 
FQ - price of agricultural research. 
Expenditure. — expenditures on state experiment station research by 
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state i. 
The expenditure data are obtained from Funds for Research in State 
Agricultural Experiment Stations and Other State Institution, for 
1951-1966, and Inventory of Agricultural Research, for 1967-1982, The 
growth of expenditures for all the states are reported in Table 5. The 
mean growch rate of expenditures for the U.S. as a whole over the period 
1951-1982 was 8.6 percent. The mean expenditure for each state as a 
percent of the region total (regions being defined in terms of geoclimatic 
considerations) varies widely across states. State government expenditures 
on agricultural reesearch vary from 10 percent for Maryland to 48 percent 
for New York, in the Northeast region. A similar pattern holds for other 
regions (Table 5). This shows that we have quite disparate players in the 
regions, who could be characterized as small and major players. Demand 
decisions for agricultural research may vary between such diverse players. 
4. Price of Agricultural Research 
A price index for agricultural research should capture the costs of 
inputs into research, which includes cost of scientists' time and other 
inputs. Single price indices based on the implicit GDP deflator are 
usually used to proxy the price of agricultural research. However, an 
index that covers all the components of research expenditures is important 
if it is to depict the price of research accurately. A base weighted 
(Laspeyres) index is acceptable only as long as there are no significant 
shifts in the composition of research expenditures. Research expenditures 
87 
Table 5. State agricultural research expenditures, 1951-1982 
Region/State Growth of Research 
Expenditure 
(per annum) 
Mean Research 
Expenditure 
(million $) 
Mean Expenditure 
as percent of 
the region total 
Northeast 
New York 7.9% 15 48% 
New Jersey 6.9% 6 18% 
Maryland 8.2% 3 10% 
Pennsylvania 7.9% 7 21% 
Delaware 7.6% 1 4% 
Annalachian 
Kentucky 8.6% 5 16% 
Virginia 10.4% 7 23% 
West Virginia 6.0% 2 7% 
Tennessee 9.0% 5 17% 
North Carolina 10.0% 12 38% 
Lake 
Minnesota 8.7% 9 33% 
Wisconsin 8.6% 10 36% 
Michigan 9.0% 9 32% 
Southeast 
Alabama 0.7% 12 30% 
Georgia 13.1% 10 24% 
South Carolina 8.5% 4 11% 
Florida 9.5% 15 36% 
Corn Belt 
Iowa 8.0% 9 22% 
Illinois 7.0% 8 19% 
Indiana 8.5% 9 23% 
Ohio 7.5% 8 19% 
Missouri 10.0% 7 17% 
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Table 5. (Continued) 
Region/State Growth of Research Mean Research Mean Expenditure 
Expenditure Expenditure as percent of 
(per annum) (million $) the region total 
Northern Plains 
North Dakota 9.8% 5 19% 
South Dakota 9.3% 3 13% 
Nebraska 10.0% 9 36% 
Kansas 11.0% 8 32% 
Mountains 
Montana 8.0% 4 14% 
Utah 10.0% 3 11% 
Nevada 10.0% 2 5% 
Idaho 9.0% 3 12% 
Colorado 13.0% 6 23% 
New Mexico 8.4% 2 7% 
Arizona 10.5% 5 20% 
Wyoming 7.5% 2 7% 
Delta 
Arkansas 10.0% 6 28% 
Mississippi 9.0% 7 31% 
Louslana 10.0% 9 41% 
Southern Plains 
Oklahoma 6.9% 5- 20% 
Texas 8.8% 19 80% 
Pacific 
Washington 7.5% 8 17% 
Oregon 8.4% 8 17% 
California 9.4% 31 66% 
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have, however, undergone a major shift in emphasis over time, with the 
proportion of total expenditures going to capital rather than non-capital 
goods increasing steadily. Pardey et al, (1987) have shown that using the 
common price indices - the implicit GDP deflator, an index of university 
teacher salaries, and the fixed weight deflator - grossly underestimates 
state government expenditures on research. In this study we use the 
Huffman-Evenson (1988) index, which is a weighted average of an index of 
salaries of college and university faculty members (70%) (American 
Association of Universitv Professors, various years) and the wholesale 
price index (30%) (Executive Office of the President, 1987), was used in 
the analysis. The weights between faculty salaries and other items 
represent the 1951-1982 period well. The wholesale price index represents 
prices of items that do not have a large labor cost share. The set of 
goods included In the index, however, is broader than the set of 
nonscientist goods purchased by agricultural experiment stations. 
5. Price of private good 
The price index representing the composite private good (P^) is the 
implicit GDP deflator for goods and services purchased by state and local 
governments obtained from Statistical Abstract and Historical Statistics 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, several years). The index is not perfect 
because it includes state government expenditures on agricultural research. 
Since these expenditures are less than 1 percent of total state government 
expenditures, the price index for P covers primarily the nonresearch goods 
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and services. The price of private good will be used to normalize all the 
variables of the demand equation. 
6. State Revenues 
State government revenues are total state government revenues, 
including the intergovernmental transfers (Statistical Abstract, various 
years). 
7. Environmental Variables 
The environmental variable should capture the effect of geoclimatic 
conditions on demand for research by each state. This could be achieved by 
using dummy variables to denote the geo-climate specificities. However, 
working in a public good framework, state legislatures are assumed to 
operate in a regional setting in which they take into account the amount of 
net spills from other states within the same geoclimatic region. Hence, 
the effect of geoclimate conditions is captured indirectly through a spill 
term. Including an explicit environmental variable should measure only the 
effect of geoclimate considerations that have not been included in the 
spill term. Since the data are not so well disaggregated we do not have a 
measure for this (partial) environmental variable. The environmental 
variable is, nevertheless, included in the analysis to show that differing 
climate conditions will affect demand for research. Related to these 
differing climate and soil conditions is the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector in that state's economy. That is, favorable climate 
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conditions imply a relatively large agricultural sector in the state. 
Thus, the environmental variable that appears in the models includes "all 
the other factors" that affect demand for research. 
A grouping of states into regions is, therefore, important for 
defining the spillin variable. The 48 states are grouped into regions so 
that states in a region have similar geoclimate conditions. Two different 
types of classification schemes are used. States grouped into USDA's 
Econommic Research Service (ERS) production regions is one possible 
grouping where similar production conditions occur (Figure 1). This 
grouping has the advantage of being confined to state boundaries and fits 
well into the framework of state legislative decision making. There are 
eight ERS production regions: Northeast, Appalachian, Lake, Southeast, 
Corn Belt, Northern Plains, Mountain, Delta, Southern Plains, and Pacific. 
For a list of the states in each of these regions see Table 6. With the 
ERS grouping, however, some regions include only two or three states. This 
would suggest that to make production region boundaries to coincide with 
state boundaries, parts of some states that have similar geoclimate 
conditions, were not included. 
Consequently, another classification scheme based on the 1957 Yearbook 
of Agriculture with a system of sixteen geoclimate regions including 
thirty- four subregions was used (Figure 2). This groups relatively close 
geoclimate neighbors and less-close neighbors. This categorization is 
based on geoclimate considerations alone and does not follow state 
boundaries, so that a state could be located in two or more regions. In 
our application of this classification, all states in a region that have 
Figure 1. ERS Production Regions (USDA-CSRS, Inventory of Agricultural Research) 
93 
Table 6. List of states in the ERS production regions 
Northeast 
New York 
New Jersey 
Maryland 
Pennsylvania 
Delaware 
Appalachian 
Kentucky 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Tennessee 
North Carolina 
Lake States 
Minnesota 
Wisconsin 
Michigan 
Southeast 
Northern Plains 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Nebraska 
Kansas 
Mountains 
Montana 
Utah 
Nevada 
Idaho 
Colorado 
New Mexico 
Arizona 
Wyoming 
Delta 
Arkansas 
Mississippi 
Louisiana 
Southern Plains 
Alabama 
Georgia 
South Carolina 
Florida 
Corn Belt 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Pacific 
Iowa Washington 
Illinois Oregon 
Indiana California 
Ohio 
Missouri 
Figure 2. Geoclimatic Regions (USDA, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1957) 
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Table 7. List of states in the Geoclimatic regions 
Upper Central Region 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Ohio 
South Dakota 
Wisconsin 
South and East-Central Uplands 
Arkansas Missouri 
Alabama New Mexico 
Florida North Carolina 
Georgia Ohio 
Illinois Oklahoma 
Indiana South Carolina 
Kansas Tennessee 
Kentucky Texas 
Louisiana Virginia 
Mississippi 
West 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Mexico 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Utah 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Northeast 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
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any part Included in the region are counted In that region. This means In 
some cases a particular state Is Included in more than one of the regional 
grouping of states. 
This classification scheme has several regions and subreglons. Again, 
some of the regions are very small. For empirical purposes, we grouped 
together regions that were geographically close, on the assumption that if 
the regions are close they have somewhat similar conditions and flow of 
spills across these regions Is possible. This alternative grouping of 
regions is an arbitrary procedure. Hence, several different combinations 
of regions were tried. For the final analysis we have four major regions: 
Northeast, South and East-Central Uplands, Upper Central region and West. 
Within each region all subreglons are included; hence no state was 
partitioned between regions. The regions might Include some states that 
may not seem to be geocllmatically similar. This is because in our 
regional groups a state is Included even if only a small part of it is 
Included in the geocllmate region. A list of all the states included in 
the various regions using this classification scheme are reported in 
Table 7. 
D. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the empirical specification of the joint 
product model for the Nash-Cournot and the Lindahl allocation schemes. The 
problems involved in the empirical specification of these models are 
discussed. Also, the theory and procedure of the non-nested J test to 
97 
distinguish between the Nash and Lindahl models is given. Finally, the 
data and variables used in the empirical models was briefly discussed. In 
the next chapter results from fitting these empirical relations will be 
presented which will show if the relations obtained from theoretical 
considerations can be validated by the data. 
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IV. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES OF DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
Chapter IV presents econometric estimates from the empirical models 
described In Chapter III, using U.S. annual data for state agricultural 
experiment stations, from 1951-1982. These estimates provide support for 
the determinants of demand derived from theoretical models In Chapter II, 
Also, the results from these models help Identify the public good 
formulation that "best" describes demand for agricultural research. 
Further, results from the nonnested J test, designed to distinguish between 
the competing Nash-Cournot and Llndahl models, are presented. 
This chapter is laid out as follows. Section A presents results from 
fitting the Nash-Cournot model of demand for agricultural research. As 
discussed in Chapter III, two classification schemes are used to group 
states into regions. This grouping of states is needed to define the 
public good - that is, agricultural research. Hence, agricultural 
research is a public good for states within a region but a private good 
with respect to other regions. That is, agricultural research from one 
region is exclusive to states in that region and can not be used by states 
in other regions. This arises from the geoclimatic specificity of 
agricultural research. The degree of publlcness of agricultural research 
diminishes as geoclimatic conditions change. 
The two classification schemes used are the geoclimatic regions and 
the ERS production regions. Nash-Cournot estimates are presented for both 
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these classification schemes. Results from these two schemes are evaluated 
to see which classification scheme gives the better set of results. We 
expect the classification scheme that measures the spillin variable most 
accurately (that is, takes account of all the possible spillins) to give 
the best results. 
In Section B, results for the Lindahl model of demand for agricultural 
research are presented. Fitting the Nash-Cournot model for both the 
classification schemes identifies the classification method that gives 
better estimates of demand. Hence, the Lindahl model was fitted for only 
one classification scheme - the geoclimatic regions. Finally, in Section 
C, results from the J test to determine the adequacy of the two competing 
models are presented. 
A. Nash-Cournot Model of Demand for Agricultural Research 
The empirical specification of the Nash-Cournot model for joint 
products is given by Equation (III.l). The right-hand side variables of 
this equation, that is F^^ and SPILL^^, exhibit randomness. Hence, this 
equation is fitted as a system, using two-stage least squares estimation, 
whose specification is given by Equations (III.5), (III.6), and (III.7). 
When significant first-order autocorrelation is present in the disturbances 
of Equation (III.5), then Equations (III.6), (III.7), and (III.8) are 
fitted to the data. 
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1. Nash-Cournot results for geoclimatlc regions 
The Nash-Cournot model was fitted for the 48 states, grouped into 
regions using the geoclimatic classification scheme. This scheme 
demarcates several regions and subregions. However, for the final 
empirical analysis we identified 4 major regions: Upper Central, 
Northeast, South and East-Central Uplands, and the West region. The demand 
equation was fitted for all the states in each of these regions. In some 
cases, states that accounted for a very small share of the total 
agricultural research expenditures in a region had exceptionally large t-
ratios for the coefficient of the spillin variable. These states, for 
which the share of agricultural research expenditures accounted for less 
than 4 percent of the total level for the region, were excluded from the 
final analysis. Results for the regions, when no state was excluded, are 
reported in Appendix C. 
Tables 8-11 report two-stage least squares estimates of demand for 
agricultural research. Data for equations in which rho (p) are found to be 
significantly different from zero are transformed and the equation refitted 
to give two-stage least squares estimates, adjusted for autocorrelation. 
The estimated autocorrelation coefficients (p) are reported in the second 
column in the tables. The estimated coefficients on the variables 
represent the demand elasticities for research. 
The price elasticity of demand for agricultural research (given by 
coefficient on In P^) is negative and statistically significant for all the 
states. Earlier studies on demand for agricultural research do not use any 
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Table 8. Corn Belt: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)^ 
Regressors 
States ft Constant InPt InF^ 
it 
InSPILL^ 
it 
Illinois 0.596 1.277 -1.176 0,027 0.958 
(2.74) (-10.42) (0.87) (16.78) 
Indiana 0.702 0.483 -1.479 0.011 1.002 
(0.79) (-10.23) (0.15) (8.82) 
Iowa _ 0.171 -1.238 -0.046 1.091 
(0.74) (-10.10) (-0.66) (11.02) 
Michigan . -0.303 -1.153 0.011 1.067 
(-1.19) (-11.92) (0.28) (14.44) 
Nebraska . -0.423 -1.259 0.116 0.949 
(-1.83) (-11.16) (2.57) (14.28) 
Ohio . 0.844 -1.264 0.127 0.798 
(2.41) (-9.41) (2.29) (7.91) 
Wisconsin 0.522 -1.357 0.017 0.975 
(1.91) (-8.54) (0.69) (20.58) 
^The smallest player in the region, South Dakota, with share 
of agricultural research of 3.7% has been excluded. 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 9. Northeast: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)* 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
t it it 
Connecticut 
Maryland 0.483 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
0.972 -0.838 
(2.46) (-7.04) 
0.312 -0.856 
(0.57) (-6.41) 
1.283 -0,645 
(1.29) (-2.95) 
-0.053 -1.731 
(2.66) (-9.43) 
0.024 -0.867 
(0.08) (-10.58) 
0.037 0.879 
(0.76) (9.44) 
0.027 0.957 
(0.60) (9.34) 
0.081 0.813 
(1.36) (5.00) 
-0.101 1.149 
(0.95) (4.50) 
0.042 0.971 
(1.28) (13.82) 
*Six players with share of agricultural research of less than 
4% has been excluded. 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 10. South and East-Central Uplands: Two-stage least squares 
estimates of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. 
(Dependent variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in 
parentheses) ^ 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
^ it it 
Arkansas .717 -0 .486 -1 .197 0 .098 0 .959 
(-0 .50) (-6 .75) (3 .16) (18 .86) 
Alabama .645 3 .752 -1 .169 -0 .207 0 .918 
(3 .63) (-3 .81) (-2 .20) (9 .48) 
Florida . 0 .341 -1 .279 0 .088 0 .921 
(0 .81) (-6 .43) (3 .90) (16 .89) 
Georgia - -0 .164 -1 .216 0 .083 0 .971 
(-0 .44) (-6 .66) (3 .01) (18 .11) 
Illinois .619 0, .722 -1 .158 0 .046 0, 979 
(0. 77) (-6 .81) (2 .30) (21, ,62) 
Indiana .498 -0. ,329 -1, 343 0, 054 0, ,998 
(-0. ,31) (-7, .07) (1. ,76) (17. 83) 
Kansas .351 -0. 883 -1. ,267 0. 119 0. 945 
(-0. 95) (-7. ,43) (3. 33) (17. 98) 
Kentucky .435 0. 238 -1. 196 0. 051 0. 989 
(0. 23) (-6. 89) (2. 22) (19. 90) 
Louisiana . -0. 416 -1. 198 0. 125 0. 942 
(-1. 26) (-6. 95) (3. 49) (18. 85) 
Mississippi - -0. 225 -1. 327 0. 071 0. 987 
(-0. 57) (-6. 57) (1. 97) (16. 55) 
Missouri . -0. 141 -1. 111 0. 089 0. 968 
(-0. 45) (-7. 17) (3. 44) (20. 57) 
®When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 10. (Continued) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
^ it it 
N. Carolina -0.309 -1.203 0 .109 0 .953 
(-0.82) (-6.61) (4 .13) (18 .14) 
New Mexico 0.031 -1.179 0 .089 0 .951 
(0.09) (-7.01) (2 .76) (17 .31) 
Ohio 0.101 -1.249 0 .054 0 .978 
(0.27) (-6.73) (2 .26) (18 .14) 
Oklahoma -0.205 -1.177 0 .114 0 .940 
(-0.69) (-7.29) (3, .19) (19 .56) 
S. Carolina .603 0.347 -1.159 0. ,093 0, 937 
(0.34) (-6.44) (3. ,22) (17, .57) 
Tennessee -0.224 -1.204 0. 068 0. 995 
(-0.64) (-6.89) (2. 32) (18. 98) 
Texas -0.223 -1.344 0. 127 0. 914 
(-0.13) (-2.24) (1. 24) (3. 61) 
Virginia -0.010 -1.257 0. 054 0. 991 
(-0.02) (-6.71) (2. 33) (17. 93) 
West Virginia -0.019 -1.236 0. 048 1. 000 
(-0.05) (-6.89) (1. 56) (17. 57) 
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Table 11. West: Two-stage least squares estimates of the demand 
for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent variable is 
InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
^ It It 
Arizona .706 0.048 -1.000 0.027 0 .967 
(0.97) (-60.12) (5.76) (223 .62) 
California . 0.515 -0.949 0.147 0 .839 
(2.06) (-4.23) (4.50) (16 .13) 
Colorado - 0.183 -1.133 0.177 0 .839 
(0.65) (-4.46) (3.49) (12 .66) 
Idaho . 0.261 -1.167 0.152 0 .872 
(1.11) (-5.61) (2.79) (13 .23) 
Kansas .310 -1.326 -1.193 0.196 0 .869 
(-1.51) (-6.23) (3.72) (16 .63) 
Minnesota .588 1.213 -1.249 0.079 0, .938 
(1.32) (-5.20) (2.47) (22 ,53) 
Montana . 0.192 -1.125 0.174 0. ,855 
(0.89) (-5.78) (3.24) (13, 96) 
Nebraska - -0.244 -1.118 0.189 0. ,876 
(-1.12) (-5.87) (4.17) (17. 41) 
Nevada - 0.695 -1.087 0.124 0. 869 
(2.29) (-5.49) (3.18) (13. 85) 
New Mexico 0.086 -1.047 0.181 0. 849 
(0.44) (-5.85) (4.08) (16. 25) 
North Dakota _ -0.630 -0.995 0.315 0. 774 
(-2.69) (-5.76) (5.39) (14. 14) 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 11. (Continued) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
c fr f 
Oklahoma -0 .448 -1 .074 0 .200 0 .867 
(-1 .63) (-6 .15) (4 .11) (19 .87) 
Oregon 0 .476 -1 .002 0 .121 0 .887 
(2 .25) (-5 .20) (3 .39) (18 .26) 
South Dakota -0 .301 -1, .189 0 .082 1, .000 
(-1 .05) (-6. 28) (2 .17) (30 .76) 
Texas 0 .414 -0, 884 0 ,437 0, 472 
(0, .43) (-1. 19) (2 ,28) (1. 73) 
Utah - • 0, 351 -1. 231 0, ,066 • 0. 957 
(1. 29) (-5. 57) (1. 71) (16. 95) 
Washington 0. 407 -1. 192 0. 097 0. 911 
(1. 78) (-5. 76) (2. 35) (17. 08) 
Wyoming 0. 151 -0. 986 0. 204 0. 832 
(0. 82) (-5. 81) (4. 99) (18. 04) 
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price data in their analysis, hence there are no other results to 
corroborate (or refute) our finding. Economic theory, however, would 
dictate that own-price elasticity be negative. 
The estimated price elasticity varies over the four geoclimatic 
regions. For the Upper-Central region the price elasticity of demand lies 
between -1,087 and -1.479, In South and East-Central Uplands, the 
elasticity ranges between -1.111 and -1.344; for West it lies between 
-0.884 and -1.249. For the Northeast region, the absolute value of price 
elasticity, except for New York, is less than 1, lying between -0.645 and 
-0.867. For New York, it is -1.731. Thus, the Northeast region is the 
only group indicating an inelastic price response to demand for research. 
For all the states, the price elasticity measure is significantly different 
from zero. 
Since the geoclimatic grouping of states does not coincide with the 
s t a t e  b o u n d a r i e s ,  s o m e  s t a t e s  a p p e a r  i n  t w o  o r  m o r e  r e g i o n s ;  e . g . ,  
Minnesota is included in the Upper Central region and the West region. The 
elasticity measures for price, full income, and spillin differ for the same 
state when included in different regions. This is because the value of the 
spillin variable changes with a different grouping of states. This 
different spillin measure, and consequently the full income measure, gives 
different price elasticity, and different full income and spillin 
elasticities. However, these elasticity measures for the same state differ 
slightly with different groupings, and the sign of the elasticities remains 
unchanged, 
The next set of elasticity measures presented in the Tables are the 
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full income elasticities, given by the coefficient on In The full 
income elasticities vary considerably over regions. In general, full 
income elasticity is positive, but there are some states for which it is 
negative. In the Upper Central region, the elasticity measure lies between 
0.011 and 0.127. States where full income elasticity is negative, the 
value of this elasticity is not significantly different from zero. For 
Nebraska, Ohio, and Kansas, in the Upper Central region, the full income 
elasticity is positive and significantly different from zero. 
In the Northeast region, the full income elasticities are positive, 
but not significantly different from zero, for all states, except New York. 
For New York the full income elasticity is negative, though not different 
from zero. 
The West region and South and East-Central Uplands exhibit positive 
and statistically significant full income elasticities. In South and East-
Central Uplands, the elasticity is positive for all states, except Alabama. 
However, the absolute value of these elasticities is small ranging between 
0.046 and 0.207. For West, this elasticity ranges between 0.027 and 0.437. 
Thus, demand for agricultural research exhibits a positive response to 
full income. This implies that, other things being equal, wealthier states 
will spend more on agricultural research. This supports earlier research 
by Huffman and Miranowski (1981) who report an income elasticity estimate 
of about 0.18. This also supports Schultz's (1971) results that spending 
by state experiment stations on research increases with revenues of the 
state. 
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In our study, however, the full income elasticity measure is not 
exactly comparable to income elasticity measures obtained in the earlier 
studies. Full income includes the spillin term which will change the 
elasticity measure obtained. Since the spillin elasticity, based on 
theoretical considerations discussed earlier, can be positive or negative, 
it is difficult to isolate the income (or revenue) effect from the total 
full income measure. Positive full income elasticity, which is obtained 
for most states, implies that agricultural research is a normal good for 
the state legislatures making decisions for demand for agricultural 
research. 
The third elasticity measure in our study is the spillin elasticity. 
This elasticity picks up the change in demand for research due to a change 
in the level of spillins. The spillin elasticity is important for two 
reasons. First, if this elasticity measure is significantly different from 
zero, then the joint product model is a better explanation of demand for 
agricultural research compared with the pure public good model. Second, a 
positive and statistically significant spillin elasticity implies that the 
private outputs (benefits) obtained from providing agricultural research 
are important determinants of demand for research. 
The spillin elasticity is positive and significantly different from 
zero for all states. For Upper Central region, the elasticity measure lies 
between 0.798 and 1.091. In the Northeast, the spillin measure lies 
between 0.813 and 1.149; for South and East-Central Uplands the elasticity 
measure ranges between 0.90 and 1.0; and for West region between 0.774 and 
1.0. Demand for agricultural research, thus, shows strongest response to a 
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change in the level of spillins. Statistically significant estimates of 
the spillin elasticity also provide strong support for the Nash-Cournot 
joint product model as against the pure public good model. The private 
goods (or benefits) obtained from providing agricultural research are 
important in a state's decision on demand for research. These private 
goods may include specific type of research that is only applicable to the 
state in which it is produced; or it may include some indirect benefits 
obtained from engaging in research activity like "prestige" among other 
states in the same region; support of farmers' lobby for other issues; 
increase in chances of reelection of the state legislatures, etc. 
2. Nash-Cournot model for ERS production regions 
The ERS classification scheme also groups states by geoclimatic 
considerations, but in this classification the region and state boundaries 
coincide. We first present the results from using this scheme and then, in 
the following section, evaluate the two sets of results to determine which 
classification gives the best results. The grouping of states is crucial 
in a public goods framework, as is discussed later. 
There are 9 ERS production regions: Appalachian, Corn Belt, Delta, 
Lake States, Mountain, Northeast, Northern Plains, Pacific, and Southeast. 
Some of these regions are very small containing only three or four states; 
e.g.. Northern Plains has only 4 states and Pacific region has only 3 
states. The ERS regions provide an alternative arbitrary grouping of 
states into regions where spillover benefits from agricultural research 
might be expected to occur. The most likely deficiency with this 
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Table 12. Appalachian: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^^ InSPILL^^ 
Kentucky 0. 489 -1 .290 -0 .624 1 .811 
(1. 41) (-2 .20) (-1 .01) (2 .21) 
N. Carolina -1. 169 -0 .873 0 .321 0 .708 
(-9. 39) (-8, .00) (7, .27) (13, .34) 
Tennessee 0. 443 -0, .942 -0, .052 1 .  053 
(1. 36) (-6, 16) (-0. 43) (8, .36) 
Virginia 0. 023 -1. 158 -0. 017 1. 030 
(0. 19) (-12. 73) (-0. 35) (14. 52) 
West Virginia 0. 647 -0. 931 0. 004 0. 32 
(20. 63) (-41. 13) (0. 37) (7. 27) 
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Table 13. Corn Belt: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)^ 
Regressors 
States p® Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
C it it 
Illinois 0.486 2.210 -0.719 0.025 0 .912 
(6.68) (-15.34) (1.37) (23 .24) 
Indiana 0.712 1.049 -1.184 0.057 0 .876 
(1.59) (-15.29) (0.98) (8, .50) 
Iowa _ 0.238 -0.769 -0.021 1. ,055 
(0.83) (-10.20) (-0.34) (10. 18) 
Missouri 0.528 -0.913 -1.390 -0.114 1. 222 
(-1.64) (-11.34) (-1.00) (6. 36) 
Ohio . 0.321 -0.999 0.028 0. 949 
(0.59) (-10.05) (0.41) (6. 64) 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 14. Delta: Two-stage least squares estimates of the 
demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)^ 
Regressors 
States p® Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILlf 
t it it 
Arkansas 0.669 -0 .088 -1, 124 0 .039 0 .974 
(-0 .32) (-5, 76) (0 .45) (11 .47) 
Mississippi -0, 603 -0. ,117 0, ,257 0, ,839 
(-2, .92) (-0. 78) (3, .31) (8. 97) 
Louisiana -3, 852 -0. 005 0, ,837 0, ,303 
(-0. 87) (-0. 01) (1. 22) (0. 67) 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 15. Lake States: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)^ 
Regressors 
States p® Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
t it it 
Michigan 1. 789 -0, 772 0 .497 0 .105 
(0. 61) (-1. 15) (1 .19) (0, 10) 
Minnesota 0.475 -1. 049 -1. 387 0, 046 0, 819 
(4. 09) (-10. 18) (0, ,874) (9, ,86) 
Wisconsin 1. 267 -1. 185 -0. 014 0. 914 
(4. 72) (-8. 43) (-0. 45) (15. 25) 
®When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation occurs, 
p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 16. Mountain: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)® 
Regressors 
States p® Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
G it It 
Arizona 0.585 -0.319 -0.674 0 .079 0 .983 
(-1.56) (-8.02) (2 .56) (16 .09) 
Colorado • -0.745 -1.937 -0 .14 1 .191 
(-2.71) (-9.22) (-1 .68) (10 .62) 
Idaho 0.393 -1.060 -0. 014 0, .985 
(6.95) (-26.95) (-0, .85) (47 .55) 
Montana • 0.680 -0.912 0, .032 0, .915 
(9.23) (-19.18) (1. ,39) (34. 59) 
New Mexico _ 0.253 -0.821 0. ,063 0. ,918 
(3.89) (-18.35) (1. ,90) (23. ,60) 
Nevada 0.053 -0.880 0. 029 0. 978 
(0.878) (-45.07) (3. 69) (65. 06) 
Utah • 0.391 -1.035 -0. 003 0. 972 
(7.08) (-30.22) (-0. 28) (59. 34) 
Wyoming 0.462 0.537 -0.986 -0. 022 0. 982 
(10.96) (-18.11) (-0. 66) (28. 14) 
®When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
116 
Table 17. Northeast; Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InÇf and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
C it it 
Connecticut 0 .419 -0 .967 -0 .014 0 .988 
(1 .92) ( •  14 .84) (-0 .56) (21 .09) 
Delaware 0 .138 -0 .980 -0 .004 0 .996 
(2 .88) ( •  64 .01) (-1 .24) (141 .26) 
Maine -0 .196 -1 .012 0 .017 0 .984 
(-0 .65) ( •  88 .48) (4 .76) (160 .76) 
Maryland -0 .107 -0 .965 -0 .007 1 .031 
(-0 .63) ( - 22 .02) (-0 .49) (33 .88) 
Massachusetts 0 .170 -1, 039 -0 .024 1, 018 
(2 .88) ( -43, 24) (-3, .32) (78, 35) 
New Hampshire -0, 111 -1. 017 -0, 011 1. ,025 
(-2. 69) ( -95. 55) (-3, ,08) (142, .5) 
New Jersey- 0. 433 -0. 838 0. 029 0. 949 
(1. 05) (-8.75) (1.22) (14.83) 
New York 0. 939 -1. 159 0. 032 0. 881 
(2. 66) (  -9. 43) (0. 95) (11. 92) 
Pennsylvania 0. 131 -0. 867 0. 044 0. 953 
(0. 96) ( -21. 89) (3. 17) (32. 54) 
Rhode Island -0. 063 -1. 016 -0. 001 1. 009 
(-2. 72) (-126. 99) (-0. 75) (280. 19) 
Vermont -0. 015 -0. 998 0. 003 1. 001 
(-0. 34) (-107. 68) (0. 63) (120. 97) 
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Table 18. Northern Plains: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
^ it it 
Kansas 1.475 -1.328 -0 .184 1 .107 
(0.56) (-2.46) (-0 .34) (2 .53) 
Nebraska -1.071 -0.806 0 ,269 0. ,814 
(-7.49) (-8.90) (5 .11) (15. ,09) 
North Dakota -0.187 -0.906 0. ,143 0, ,87 
(-0.40) (-5.74) (1. 37) (11. 75) 
South Dakota 0.451 -0.680 0. 002 1. 003 
(4.69) (-11.45) (0. 29) (86. 74) 
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Table 19. Pacific: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)* 
Regressors 
States p* Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
c it it 
California 4, .776 -0. 604 0, .954 -0 .821 
(0 ,96) (-0. 44) (1 .39) (-0 .54) 
Oregon 0, .804 -0. 764 0 ,074 0. ,867 
(4. ,03) (-5. 77) (1. 36) (11. ,43) 
Washington 0.493 1. 114 -0. 914 0, 120 0, 753 
(5. 29) (-10. 11) (2. 89) (12. 57) 
®When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 20. Southeast: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses)^ 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILlf 
c it it 
Alabama 0.632 11 .769 -3 .39 0 .408 -0 .983 
(8 .95) (-4 .03) (0 .44) (-0 .77) 
Florida 1, .815 -1 .451 0, .101 0, .665 
(1. 41) (-4 .96) (1. 96) (7 .57) 
Georgia - 0, 474 -0 .902 0, .136 0, .801 
(0. ,33) (-2, .85) (2, ,31) (8, ,33) 
S. Carolina 0.469 1. 096 -1, .209 0. 016 0. ,859 
(1. 81) (-8, .08) (0. 73) (18, ,53) 
®When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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classification is that research benefits generally spillover a larger 
geographic area than for states in one of these regions. 
Econometric estimates for the Nash-Coumot model for ERS production 
regions are presented in Tables 12-20. The tables list the states in the 
region; the estimated autocorrelation coefficient; and the estimated 
elasticities of demand for price, full income and spillin. 
The price elasticity is negative and statistically significant for all 
the states. This elasticity measure, however, shows considerable variation 
across states. The lowest price elasticity is obtained for Mississippi at 
-0.005 and the highest for Alabama at -3.39. For other states it ranges 
between -0.70 and -1.39. 
The full income elasticity measure is positive for some states while 
negative for other states. Delta, Pacific, and Southeast are the only 
regions with positive full income elasticities for all the states in the 
region. The value of the elasticity, in cases where it is negative, is not 
significantly different from zero. Only for New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts the full income elasticity is negative and significant. This 
implies that agricultural research is an inferior good for these states. 
However, for most cases, we may conclude that agricultural research is a 
normal good. Where the elasticity is negative, but not different from 
zero, the effect of full income on demand for research is small or 
negligible. 
r 
Spillin elasticity, given by coefficient on In SPILL^^ term, is 
generally positive and significant. The value of this elasticity ranges 
between 0.105 and 1.811. This elasticity is negative for California and 
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Alabama, but for both cases it is not significantly different from zero. 
The statistically significant measure of elasticity, once again, provides 
support for the joint product model. For Louisiana and Michigan, however, 
this elasticity measure, though positive, is not significantly different 
from zero. This would imply that the pure public good model is a better 
explanation of demand for research for these two states. Nevertheless, we 
still find strong support for the joint product model of demand for 
agricultural research. 
3• Geoclimatic regions vs ERS production regions 
Both the geoclimatic regions and the ERS production regions provide 
reasonable estimates for elasticities of demand for agricultural research. 
The ERS production regions are, however, somewhat ad hoc in their grouping 
because of the requirement that regional boundaries coincide with state 
boundaries. Such a grouping implies that a state is included in only one 
region, even if the state (or a part of this state) is geoclimatically 
similar to some other state in an adjoining region. This is of particular 
importance in a public goods framework because of the importance to measure 
the spillin variable correctly. Correct regional grouping will define the 
public good properly for states within a region; if some states are left 
out for which spillins (or spill-outs) occur from this region, the spillin 
measure will be incorrectly defined and the elasticities will not capture 
the publicness of the good. 
This will be clear if we compare the estimates of elasticities 
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obtained from the two classification schemes. With the geoclimatic 
regional grouping, the full income elasticity is positive and statistically 
significant for 35 states. For 4 states the full income elasticity is 
negative, though statistically not different from zero. With the ERS 
production region grouping, on the other hand, only 8 states have positive 
and significant full income elasticities. ^There are 17 negative full 
income elasticities. For the spillin elasticity, all states grouped 
according to the geoclimatic scheme, have positive and statistically 
significant values. For the ERS production region scheme, 6 states have 
elasticity values that are not different from zero. 
Thus, the geoclimatic grouping provides estimates that are what we 
would expect from theoretical considerations. The signs of the elasticity 
are correct and their statistical properties are better. This occurs " 
because the spillin variable, fundamental to the public goods framework, is 
correctly measured in the geoclimatic grouping. Thus, geoclimatic regions 
group states in accordance wih requirements for a public goods approach to 
demand for research. Therefore, we fit Lindahl model of demand for 
agricultural research using the geoclimatic regional grouping only. 
B. Lindahl Model of Demand for Agricultural Research 
The Lindahl model of demand for agricultural research was fitted for 
all the states grouped into regions using the geoclimatic classification 
scheme. Equations (III.11) and (III.12) summarize the Lindahl model of 
123 
demand. When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation is 
detected, equations III.12 and III.13 are fitted to the data to give two-
stage least squares estimates, corrected for autocorrelation. 
Tables 21-24 present the results from fitting these equations for all 
the states. The second column in the Tables lists the autocorrelation 
coefficients when they were found to be significantly different from zero; 
otherwise they were not listed. The other columns give the estimated 
demand elasticities for income and the cost share of the state. 
The income elasticity is positive and statistically significant for 
all states in all the four regions. This elasticity measure ranges between 
0.001 and 0.889 for the Upper Central region; between 0.089 and 0.650 for 
the Northeast, For the South and East-Central Uplands this measure lies 
between 0.319 and 0.837 and for West between 0.342 and 1.037. For South 
Dakota the income elasticity is negative, indicating that agricultural 
research is an inferior good. For all the other states, positive income 
elasticities indicate that wealthier states spend more on agricultural 
research. 
The other regressor of the Lindahl model is (In + In 6^^). This 
term picks up the price effect on demand for agricultural research. There 
are two prices that the agent faces - the normalized price (In P^) and the 
individualized price or the cost share of the state, given by In 0^^. 
Theory would suggest the total price effect be negative for the states. 
The total cost elasticity (including price and share terms) is found 
to be negative for most of the states. In the Upper Central region this 
elasticity is negative and statistically significant for all the states, 
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Table 21. Upper Central Region: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the Lindahl demand for SAES research, 1951-82. 
(Dependent variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in 
parentheses)* 
Regressors 
States Constant Inlit InP^ + In^ it 
Illinois 0.602 5.353 0.289 -0.729 
(7.99) (5.06) (-6.16) 
Indiana 0.505 0.879 0.518 -1.191 
(0.68) (5.30) (-2.74) 
Iowa _ 2.019 0.657 -0.356 
(4.29) (12.92) (-2.53) 
Kansas . -0.685 0.889 -0.286 
(-0.58) (20.59) (-2.17) 
Minnesota . 3.518 0.604 -0.052 
(5.44) (10.58) (-0.19) 
Missouri _ 2.969 0.796 0.496 
(3.36) (20.48) (2.57) 
Nebraska _ 0.989 0.814 -0.228 
(0.68) (11.59) (-1.31) 
Ohio 0.506 2.994 0.521 -0.416 
(4.93) (12.97) (-5.73) 
S. Dakota 0.907 12.059 0.001 -0.046 
(11.75) (0.07) (-0.20) 
Wisconsin 4.868 0.376 -0.613 
(6.66) (5.24) (-1.91) 
*When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform data. 
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Table 22. South and East-Central Uplands: Two-stage least squares 
estimates of the Lindahl demand for SÂES research, 
1951-82. (Dependent variable is InQ^ and t-ratios 
are in parentheses)® 
Regressors 
States p® Constant Inl^^ InP^ + 
Arkansas 1.998 0.687 -0.389 
(1.89) (11.22) (-4.31) 
Alabama 3.654 0.698 0.135 
(2.69) (6.14) (2.12) 
Florida 1.816 0.553 -0.854 
(2.54) (18.51) (-8.11) 
Georgia 3.613 0.588 -0.231 
(3.25) (9.31) (-2.41) 
Illinois 5.593 0.319 -0.599 
(14.60) (11.38) (-8.99) 
Indiana 0.656 1.445 0.511 -1.048 
(0.94) (5.12) (-7.56) 
Kansas -0.873 0.837 -0.599 
(-0.85) (14.70) (-6.10) 
Kentucky 4.828 0.449 -0.394 
(8.21) (12.70) (-5.91) 
Louisiana -1.309 0.809 -0.658 
(-1.75) (18.52) (-8.52) 
Mississippi 0.174 0.715 -0.620 
(0.12) (10.28) (-3.87) 
®When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform data. 
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Table 22. (Continued) 
Regressors 
States Constant Inl^^ InPj. + ingS^ 
Missouri 2.872 0.630 -0.337 
(3.66) (13,52) (-5.16) 
N. Carolina 5.639 0.388 -0.506 
(7.29) (12.28) (-4.72) 
New Mexico 3.957 0.510 -0.392 
(5.85) (11.43) (-4.73) 
Ohio 2.817 0.452 -0.788 
(3.81) (12.41) (-6.21) 
Oklahoma 2.639 0.543 -0.598 
(4.03) (9.97) (-6.94) 
S. Carolina 3.333 0.538 -0.454 
(3.44) (11.88) (-3.37) 
Tennessee 4.302 0.562 -0.158 
(4.21) (8.50) (-1.88) 
Texas 0.432 7.148 0.444 0.275 
(5.90) (5.74) (3.78) 
Virginia 1.999 0.565 -0.671 
(2.57) (16.35) (-7.42) 
W. Virginia 5.162 0.349 -0.552 
(11.62) (9.22) (-7.60) 
127 
Table 23. West: Two-stage least squares estimates of Lindahl 
demand for SAES research, 1951-1982. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant Inl^^ inP^ + ln9%^ 
Arizona - 2.707 0.646 -0.286 
(3.43) (17.41) (-2.93) 
California . 1.641 0.620 -0.424 
(2.52) (15.72) (-3.39) 
Colorado _ 1.791 0.756 -0.125 
(2.07) (15.39) (-1.23) 
Idaho 0.400 1.348 0.591 -0.807 
(1.55) (8.52) (-6.39) 
Kansas -2.907 0.977 -0,618 
(-3.53) (18.16) (-4.73) 
Minnesota 0.565 3.23 0.342 -1.208 
(2.59) (4.50) (-10.23) 
Montana . 1.848 0.583 -0.746 
(3.42) (9.09) (-5.24) 
Nebraska 0.401 -4.014 1.023 -0.904 
(-3.22) (13.20) (-7.17) 
Nevada 3.749 0.559 -0.348 
(4.70) (18.14) (-3.37) 
New Mexico _ 1.614 0.731 -0.259 
(2.50) (10.59) (-1.99) 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table 23. (Continued) 
Regressors 
States Constant Inl^j. inP^ + Infl^^. 
North Dakota - -2 .339 1.037 -0.444 
(-2 .32) (15.24) (-2.74) 
Oklahoma l 3.476 3 .052 0.402 -0.926 
(2 .28) (3.46) (-8.26) 
Oregon - 2 .989 0.578 -0.442 
(5, .67) (11.57) (11.58) 
South Dakota 0.777 12. ,328 -0.103 -0.317 
(8. 23) (-2.56) (-1.42) 
Texas _ 1. 871 0.785 0.299 
(3. 39) (21.47) (4.79) 
Utah 0,273 2. 866 0.354 -1.046 
(4. 60) (7.50) (-8.02) 
Washington 0.498 3. 093 0.436 -0.841 
(4.12) (7.49) (-11.28) 
Wyoming 0.630 3, 982 0.355 -0.811 
(3.43) (3.45) (-8.24) 
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Table 24. Northeast; Two-stage least squares estimates of Llndahl 
demand for SAES research, 1951-1982. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant Inl^j. 
Connecticut - 5.214 0.465 0.024 
(12.87) (9.27) (0.19) 
Delaware • 5.348 0.089 -1.122 
(4.03) (1.15) (-3.58) 
Maine 0 .540 2.795 0.508 -0.540 
(1.56) (7.20) (-2.04) 
Maryland . 6.277 0.412 0.145 
(12.37) (15.46) (1.08) 
Massachus etts _ 4.398 0.650 0.547 
(7.79) (6.96) (2.14) 
N. Hampshire - 7.652 0.442 0.325 
(11.42) (14.17) (2.08) 
New Jersey 0. 384 7.146 0.330 0.130 
(13.06) (10.57) (0.84) 
New York 0. 402 5,064 0,349 -0.439 
(6.99) (7.39) (-1.28) 
Pennsylvania - 4.349 0.456 -0.092 
(6.39) (15.95) (-0.56) 
Rhode Island « 10.389 0.358 0.733 
(6.95) (10.45) (2.52) 
Vermont - 5.811 0.435 -0.086 
(5.42) (15.45) (-0.44) 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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except Missouri. The value of this elasticity ranges between -0.046 and 
-1.191. For the Northeast, it lies between -0.086 and -1.122. However, 
this elasticity is positive, and significant, for Massachusets, New 
Hampshire, and Rhode Island in the Northeast region. In the South and 
East-Central Uplands the total cost elasticity lies between -0.158 and -
1.048, except Alabama and Texas, where it is positive. In the West, the 
total cost elasticity elasticity lies between -0.125 and -1.208, but is 
positive for Texas. Thus, the total cost elasticity measure is negative, 
for most of the states, which is what we would expect from theoretical 
considerations. 
The Lindahl model also seems to explain well the demand decision for 
research by the state governments. However, given these two models -
Nash-Cournot and Lindahl - it is difficult to say, based on these demand 
estimates, which model outperforms the other. For this, we have to use 
hypothesis testing which is discussed in the following section. 
C. Nash-Cournot vs Lindahl: Results from the J Test 
As is evident from discussion in Sections A and B, both the Nash-
Cournot joint product model and the Lindahl model provide reasonable 
explanation of demand for agricultural research. Earlier studies on demand 
for public goods assume one of these conjectures to hold, and given these 
conjectures, determine the factors that influence demand. However, it may 
be the case that one of these models provides a significantly better 
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explanation than the other; or that both the conjectures are not 
appropriate to model agents' behavior in the presence of public goods. The 
validity of these conjectures as against other possible conjectures is, 
therefore, important. One method for examining this issue is the non­
nested J test that was discussed in Chapter III and summarized by 
hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The results from the J test are presented in Tables 25 and 26. This 
test was carried out for two regions - Upper Central and South and East-
Central Uplands. The results are presented for hypotheses 1 and 2. For 
each hypothesis, the coefficient on the predicted value from the competing 
model, the associated t-ratio, and the resulting conclusion are listed. 
In performing the J test, the conclusions are to reject the Lindahl 
model for all the states in the Upper Central region and the South and 
East-Central Uplands. This implies that the state legislatures are not 
engaged in a cooperative solution while determining demand for agricultural 
research. Thus, the provision levels are not Pareto optimal, which is to 
be expected, given the persistently high rates of return to agricultural 
research. 
Support for the Nash-Cournot model is "weak" and inconclusive. The 
results from the J test reject the Nash-Cournot conjecture for all states, 
except Illinois, in the Upper Central region. In the South and East-
Central Uplands, the Nash-Cournot model is accepted for Missouri and 
Minnesota. For all the other states, the Nash-Cournot model is rejected. 
The results from the J test, thus, conclusively reject the Lindahl 
model and provide "weak" support for the Nash-Cournot model. These results 
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Table 25. J Test Results; South and East-Central Uplands Region 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
States InQ^ t-ratio Conclusion InQ^ t-ratio Conclusion 
Arkansas -0.024 -4.13 Reject 1 .014 250 .33 Rej ect 
Alabama 0.321 2.20 Rej ect 0 .967 14 .30 Reject 
Florida -0.091 -20.84 Reject 1 .061 176 .41 Reject 
Georgia -0.164 -11.83 Reject 1 .035 150 .68 Reject 
Illinois -0.022 -1.85 Unable to Rej. 1 .013 113 .32 Reject 
Indiana -0.047 -11.79 Reject 1 .033 286 .10 Reject 
Kansas -0.051 -5.39 Reject 1 .074 133 .11 Reject 
Kentucky -0.049 -5.91 Rej ect 0 .980 14 .71 Reject 
Louisiana -0.076 -22.54 Rej ect 1 .049 181, .64 Reject 
Mississippi -0.071 -37.41 Reject 1 .104 82, ,56 Reject 
Missouri -0.123 -14.57 Reject 1, 041 156. ,57 Reject 
N. Carolina -0.123 -9.77 Reject 1. ,003 114. ,04 Reject 
New Mexico -0.035 -20.76 Rej ect 1. ,017 714. 89 Reject 
Ohio -0.066 -14.08 Reject 1. 048 239. 39 Reject 
Oklahoma -0.060 -23.74 Rej ect 1. 027 197. 92 Reject 
S. Carolina -0.019 -3.61 Reject 1. 012 385. 70 Reject 
Tennessee -0.114 -12.95 Rej ect 1. 015 249. 08 Reject 
Texas 0.887 6.91 Reject 1. 059 10. 88 Rej ect 
Virginia -0.033 -5.46 Reject 1. 028 237. 71 Reject 
W. Virginia -0.027 -11.92 Reject , 1. 009 392. 59 Reject 
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Table 26. J Test Results; Upper Central Region 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
States InQ^ t-ratio Conclusion InQ^ t-ratio Conclusion 
Illinois 0.263 3 .33 Rej ect 0 .958 26 .05 Reject 
Indiana -0.088 -7 .91 Reject 1 .049 100 .28 Reject 
Iowa -0.336 -23 .14 Reject 1 .010 45 .42 Reject 
Kansas -0.335 -20 .70 Reject 1 ,002 54 .15 Reject 
Michigan -0.495 -28.16 Rej ect 1, .023 45 .58 Reject 
Minnesota -0.005 -0, 16 Unable to rej. 1. ,005 100 .64 Reject 
Missouri -0.012 -0. ,80 Unable to rej. 0. 976 83, ,53 Reject 
Nebraska -0.362 -13. 88 Reject 1. 005 83, ,82 Reject 
Ohio -0.219 -2, 70 Reject 1. 142 20. 19 Reject 
S. Dakota -0.058 -2. 84 Reject 1. Oil 150. 68 Rej ect 
Wisconsin -0.191 -19. 77 Reject 1. 036 309. 32 Rej ect 
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are not definitive and do not allow us to accept one model in favor of the 
other model. This apparent "inconclusive" situation needs to be 
interpreted with caution. First, in public goods literature the Nash-
Cournot model is assumed to hold almost axiomatically. However, the 
results from this study indicate that this conjecture may not be an 
appropriate description of agents' behavior. The presence of public goods 
in the utility function implies that agents do not engage in a purely self-
interested utility maximization. On the other hand, they do not even 
engage in a fully cooperative solution. The results indicate that we need 
to look at other possible conjectures in the presence of public goods. We 
may take our cue from the growing literature in oligoply theory. One 
possible alternative strategy would be to look at consistent conjectures 
equilibrium in which the reaction functions are equated to the conjectural 
variation of the agents. 
Another reason to interpret the results from the J test with caution 
arises from earlier studies that have used this test, and from the growing 
econometric literature in this field. Most studies that have used this 
test do not find any conclusive evidence to reject or accept one of their 
models (see Beaton, 1978; Pesaran, 1982a; Backus, 1984; Antonovitz and 
Green, 1989). Pesaran (1986) notes that since the competing models in a 
non-nested hypothesis testing can not be ranked by their level of 
generality, it is very common that both the models are rejected by such 
tests. Small sample studies by Pesaran (1982b), Godfrey and Pesaran 
(1983), and Davidson and MacKinnon (1982) show that the J test rejects the 
true model too frequently with the estimated significance levels very 
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large. Some authors have suggested that the test variable of the J-
procedure be adjusted to improve its significance levels. However, 
attempts to adjust the test variable while preserving its ease of 
implementation have not been successful (Godfrey and Fesaran, 1983). 
The seeming inadequacy of the J test arises from it being a partial 
test, as has been shown by a recent study by Mizon and Richard (1986). 
They appeal to the encompassing principle while formulating a test for 
rival models. According to this principle, a model M should be able to 
explain the characteristics of rival models and, encompassing tests should 
embody this principle. The J test uses this principle, but partially. A 
complete encompassing test (CET) considers all the unknown parameters. 
That is, if Hq and constitute the two rival models, as given by 
equations III. 12 and III. 13, then a CET should compare <l> with plim Hg 
A 2 2 ^ ^ 
and (7^ with |HQ. Comparing ^ with plim HQ gives the mean 
encompassing test and comparing with |Hq gives the variance 
encompassing test. Mizon and Richard show the F test is a mean 
encompassing test and the J test is a variance encompassing test. This 
explains why the J test is a one-degree-of-freedom test no matter how many 
explanatory variables are in the models given by HQ and H^. The CET is a 
A A 2 
joint test that compares ^ and with their probability limits under HQ. 
There is no empirical evidence, however, on how the joint test performs and 
the properties of the asociated test statistic (Maddala, 1988). 
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D. Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the empirical results from fitting the 
demand functions for agricultural research. Demand functions from two 
theoretical specifications were chosen. These were the Nash-Cournot joint 
product model and the Lindahl joint product (or the pure public good) 
model. These models were fitted for the 48 contiguous states using U.S. 
annual data from 1951-1982. In the Nash-Cournot specification, demand for 
agricultural research is a function of normalized prices, full income and 
the level of spilling. In the Lindahl model, demand for agricultural 
research is a function of the agent's share of total cost of agricultural 
research for the region, and the income of the state. The empirical 
results show the price elasticity of demand for research in the Nash model 
to be negative; the full income elasticity to be positive; and the spillin 
elasticity to be positive, indicating the private aspects (or outputs) from 
research to be important determinants of demand. 
In the Lindahl model, the total cost elasticity, which is the 
individualized price for the state plus the normalized price, is negative 
for a large number of states. The income elasticity is positive, 
indicating that agricultural research is a normal good. 
The results from the J test reject the Lindahl model for all the 
states, but provide some support for the Nash-Cournot model. The "weak" 
support for the Nash-Cournot model points to the fact that more work needs 
to be done in modeling agent's conjectures about the response of other 
agents participating in the game, than the simple Nash assumptions. The 
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"weak" results should not be taken as evidence that no model is 
appropriate, in light of the econometric discussion in the earlier section 
The J test is a partial construct to test rival models. However, the ease 
of implementing this test and the fact that there is no (operational) more 
powerful test justifies the use of the J test. The results from this test 
should serve as a guide to future modeling. Also, as Deaton (1978) notes, 
it may be possible. In some cases, that economists do not possess the 
"true" model and thus, can arrive at the most appropriate specification by 
testing such tentative models. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a summary of the results obtained in this study 
and analyzes these results for their implications for the provision of 
public goods, in general, and agricultural research in particular. Also, 
results from the test of Nash and Lindahl conjectures will be evaluated. 
Any policy implications that can be drawn, given the empirical estimates of 
demand for research, will be discussed. 
Â. Summary of Results 
This study has modeled the demand for public goods, in general, and 
focussed on the demand for agricultural research, in particular. There are 
two methods that have been used in the literature to model demand for 
public goods. The nonmarket (direct) method generates demand data through 
the use of surveys, experiments, or voting results. The market (indirect) 
method uses market data from private goods to infer about demand for public 
goods (see Cornes and Sandler, 1986). The technique used in this study is 
a nonmarket evaluation for estimating demand for agricultural research. 
This technique has been used earlier by Murdoch and Sandler (1984) to 
analyze defense expenditures. This method is based on utility maximization 
subject to a resource constraint. Unlike other procedures, this method 
identifies the utility function of the decision maker and not of a 
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"representative" agent, as in the median voter model. 
This method of deriving demand functions was used to analyze demand 
for agricultural research. Two general specifications of public goods were 
used - the pure public good formulation and the impure public good 
formulation. Under the impure public good formulation, the joint product 
model and the joint-use model were analyzed. The joint product model 
exploits the geoclimatic specificity of agricultural research by 
considering the private as well as public outputs (benefits) that result 
from research. 
The joint-use model analyzes the effect of the changing mix of federal 
funds for state agricultural experiment stations from formula funds to 
competitive grants. The equilibrium conditions obtained from this model 
show that the aditional 'fixed-aggregate-level' constraint lowers the 
provision of agricultural research by the states. This is because the fear 
of (potential) loss of spillins, caused by an agent's own demand, induce 
agents to demand fewer units of research, than they would demand in absence 
of the fixed aggregate level of agricultural research. Given the already 
low level of investment in agricultural research, well documented by the 
underinvestment literature, this shift in funding will further aggravate 
the low level of provision of agricultural research. The predictions from 
this model do not imply that there is no way of determining the total 
amount of funds for a particular public project. This model only suggests 
that total allocations be made after the various agents have determined 
their own provision levels. The total allocation for the provision of a 
public good then is the sum of individual provision levels. For the 
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specific case of agricultural research, this model suggests that federal 
support should remain in the form of formula funds rather than move to 
competitive grants. 
The various formulations of agricultural research as a public good 
were analyzed for two possible allocation schemes for the agents - the 
Nash-Cournot and the Lindahl. Empirical results from both the allocation 
strategies were presented. In the Nash-Cournot model, agricultural 
research depends on prices, full Income, and the level of spillins from the 
other states. The empirical results from this model indicate that price 
and income elasticities are of the expected signs; the price elasticity is 
negative and the full income elasticity is positive. These elasticity 
measures are, however, small indicating an inelastic response to income and 
prices. Because we have full Income rather than only income (or revenues) 
of the state, the full Income elasticity Includes the effect of spillins, 
in addition to the effect of income on demand for research. Positive full 
income elasticity implies that agricultural research is a normal good for 
the state legislatures. The spillin elasticity captures the presence of 
private benefits (outputs) from agricultural research. Significantly 
different from zero value of this elasticity indicates that the joint 
product model outperforms the pure public good model as an "appropriate" 
specification of demand for agricultural research. This lends support to 
the notion of geoclimatic specificity of research - that is, there are 
some private benefits (outputs) from research that are exclusive to the 
state undertaking the research. This can also be seen as support for the 
interest group theory if the benefits from meeting the demands of the 
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Interest group are seen as private benefits from research. 
In the Lindahl model, agricultural research is found to be a function 
of income, prices, and the individualized cost share of the state in 
providing research for the region. The prices and the cost share appear in 
a multiplicative form, which in the log-linear specification becomes 
additive. The empirical results indicate that the income elasticity is 
positive and the total cost elasticity is negative. Thus, agricultural 
research is a normal good for the state legislatures. 
Both the Nash-Cournot and the Lindahl model provide reasonable 
explanations of demand for agricultural research. To test the possibility 
of one allocation strategy outperforming the other, the two strategies were 
tested against each other. For this we used the nonnested technique of the 
J test. The results from the J test, however, failed to support any one 
model. The Lindahl model was rejected for all the states, thereby implying 
that the state legislatures are not engaged in a cooperative game. The 
Nash-Cournot model was found to be valid for three out of twenty-two 
states. This small evidence does not allow us to conclude, definitively, 
that the Nash-Cournot strategy is the appropriate strategy. The somewhat 
"inconclusive" result has to be understood in light of the weaknesses of 
the J test, and the methodology behind any nonnested test. 
The two rival models to be tested by any nonnested technique specify 
the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, given the 
independent variables of that particular model. That is, equation III.12 
specifies the conditional distribution of y given X. Similarly, equation 
111,13 specifies the condition distribution y given S. Comparing these two 
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conditional distributions implies comparing the role of S under Hq and 
comparing the role of X under Thus, to compare the two models we 
should be able to derive conditional distributions of f(y|x) and g(y|s) 
under both Hq and This is what is suggested by the complete 
encompassing test of Mizon and Richard. The J test compares only the 
variance of the disturbances from one model with the disturbances under the 
rival specification. 
Given the problem of testing nonnested models, the "weak" support for 
the Nash-Cournot model suggests that state legislative decisions are 
noncooperative. However, we can look at some other noncooperative 
conjectures suggested in the literature. One possible alternative would be 
to generalize the model to look at a continuum of strategic responses. The 
Nash-Cournot model would be at the noncooperative end of this continuum 
with a conjectural variation of zero; the Lindahl model would be the 
cooperative strategy with a conjectural variation of one. We could have 
positive and negative values for the conjectural variation. 
B. Conclusions 
This study has looked at the determinants of demand for agricultural 
research in a public goods framework, for different possible strategies of 
the agents. The methodology of the study allows one to distinguish between 
the public and private aspects of research. The study also helped identify 
the public good formulation that "best" describes demand for agricultural 
research. The econometric results from the study imply that agricultural 
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research is a normal good for the state legislatures, with positive income 
elasticity and negative price elasticity. Also, the positive and 
statistically significant spillin elasticity implies that the private 
outputs from research are important determinants of demand for research, 
and that these private outputs are normal goods. 
The results from the J test opened a Pandora's box of issues, and 
pointed to some possible weaknesses in modeling agent's behavior in the 
public goods framework. The Nash conjecture has been used in all studies 
for modeling agent's behavior in a noncooperative environment. However, 
results from our study indicate that this may not be an appropriate 
conjectural assumption. Future work in this area should look at some other 
possible conjectures for the agents. 
Another problem identified by the results relates to econometrics. 
Various studies, already cited in Chapter IV, have pointed to some 
weaknesses in the J test, arising from its partial testing of the 
paramaters of interest. However, in absence of a more powerful test with 
known empirical properties of how it performs, the J test should be used to 
identify areas of possible weaknesses. The results from this test should 
provide guidance for future research. 
Various interesting research issues emerge from this study. The joint 
public good model can be applied to international agricultural research to 
determine the flow of research across international borders. It would be 
interesting, in this context, to study the effect of International 
Agricultural Research Centers on the research effort of the developing 
countries. Another issue would be to look at the private research effort, 
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and to incorporate this into the public goods model to test if there is 
crowding-out of public expenditures. The issues arising from the J test 
would be to look at the behaviorial strategies of the agents, in the 
presence of public goods. 
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VI. APPENDIX A. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 
The utility maximization problem for the i-th state under Nash-
Cournot assumptions for the pure public good model is : 
Max U^(yl, Q^; E^) 
(yi.Qi) 
subject to ^ - P^y + 
q" > qi 
i —4 
The Lagrangian associated with the problem, when Q > , is 
£ - U^(y\ Q"": E^) + A [F^ - P^y^ - P^Q^] , 
and the resulting first-order conditions are: 
(1) - APy - 0. 
(2) Uq - APq - 0. and 
(3) - PYY^ - PQQ^ - 0 
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Solving for A from equation (1) and substituting the value in equation (2) 
gives : 
MRS^Qy - Pq /Py . 
The utility maximizing problem of i-th state for the Lindahl 
allocation scheme for pure public good case is : 
Max , ul(yl,Qi; 
(yi.Qi) 
subject to - P^y^ + 
- qV * 
The Lagrangian associated with the problem is: 
- U (yl.ql; E^) + A [I^ - P^y^ - «Wl 
and the resulting first-order conditions are: 
(1) Uy - APy - 0 . 
(2) Uq - Agipqi - 0 , 
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(3) - 0 . 
The first-order conditions can be expressed as: 
MRS^ - gi Pq / Py , i-1 n. 
The i-th state's maximization problem for the joint product model, 
defined in terms of marketed goods y and Q, under Nash-Cournot assumptions 
IS : 
Max . U^(yi. giCQ^-Q^), hi(Q^-Q'-)+ m(Q^), E^) 
(yl.Qi) 
.1, n r. 1 . T, ^1 
subject to I + PQQ - P^Y + P^Q 
, y > 0 . 
The Lagrangian associated with the problem is : 
£ - U^(yi,gi(qi-Qi),hi(Qi.Qi)+ m(Q^),E^) + A [F^ - P^y^ - PqQ^^ ' 
and the first-order conditions are: 
(1) ui - APy - 0 , 
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(2) g'i + h\ yl - APq - 0 , and 
(3) - Pyy^ - PqQ^ - 0. 
where, g'^ - agi/a(Q^-Q^), and h'^ - ahi/3(Q^-Q^) . 
The first-order conditions can be expressed as: 
g'i MRS^^ + h^ MRS^y - Pq / Py , i-1 n. 
The Pareto optimal joint product model is: 
Max U^(yi,gi(qi),hi(qi)+.9. h (q^), E^) 
{yi.qi) Jfi J 
n n 
subject to 2 = S{ P y + P_Q ) 
i—1 i=l ^ 
(y^ ,gj (q^ ) ,hj (q^ hj^(qS,E^) ^  , for all j/i . 
The Lagrangian associated with the problem is : 
£ - U^tyl, gi(ql), hi(q^)+j|^ hj(q^), E^) 
JVi'^j (^^[y^'6j(q^)'hj(q'^)\^j hj^cqS.E^] - u^) + 
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n n 
|i [S - S (P + P Q^)] 
i-1 i-1 ^ Q 
The first-order conditions are; 
(1) - /iPy - 0 . 
(2) ajUJ - pPy - 0 , 
(3) g'iU^ + h'iU^ + h. Uj - MPp - 0 , 
n n . 
(4) [S - S (P + P.Q )] =0 , and 
i-1 i-1 y ^ 
(5)  U^[yJ,gj(q^).hj(qj)+j^| .  -  U ^ } -  0 
The first-order conditions can be expressed as: 
Si MRS^y + h'i MRS^y + m'J. MRsj^ - Pq / Py , i-1 n. 
The maximization problem under the Lindahl scheme for the joint 
product model is : 
Max ^ (yi, Ri(Q^), G(Q^), e"") 
(yi.Qi) 
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subject to 
. 
The Lagrangian associated with the problem is: 
£ - (yi, Ri(QS, G(Q^), E^) + A [I^ - - fiPqQ^] 
The first-order conditions are: 
(1) - APy - 0 , 
(2) R'- + G'U^ - - 0 , and 
^ 2- X z Q 
(3) - Pyyi - /PqQ^ = 0 . 
The FOCs imply the following: 
R^MRS^y + c'MRS^y « /Pq / Py , i=l n. 
The Nash-Cournot joint-use model is: 
Max ^ U^[y^, Q^. . . .Q", E^] 
(yi.qi) 
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subject to + PqQ^ 
" i Q  -  Z Q i .  
i-1 
We can rewrite the joint-use constraint as 
j/i 
or, 
n 1 ± 
(Q - S QJ) - cr - 0 , 
where 
Q~^ - - 0 . 
-i n i 
Q - (Q - z qJ)  .  
The Lagrangian associated with the above is: 
£ - u^[ y\ q\...q", E^] + A - Pyyi - PqQ^^ 
+ W [Q ^ - Q ] 
The first-order conditions are: 
(1) - APy -0 . 
(2) U^i - APq - w - 0 , 
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(3) - PqQ^ - 0 , and 
-i i 
(4) Q _ Q - 0 . 
The Lagrangian multiplier associated with the joint-use constraint, w , can 
— i 
be interpreted as the marginal utility of an additional unit of Q and 
hence, can be denoted as Uq-i- Dividing equation (2) A and gives: 
Uqi / A - Pq - w / A = 0 . 
The above expression, after substituting for the value of A , from equation 
(1), and w becomes, 
^^Qiy ~ ^^Q-iy " PQ /Py ' "• 
The Nash-Cournot joint-use - joint product model, defined for 
marketed goods, may be represented as : 
Max U^( y^' x^, Z^, E^) 
(yi.Qi) 
subject to + PqQ^ 
" i Q - 2 Q 
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where - gi(Q^), - h^CQ^) , 
- zi + , and - m(Q^) . 
The utility function can be defined over the marketed goods as ; 
U^{ y^, gi(Q^), hi(Qi)+ m(Qi), E^) 
We can decompose the total amount of agricultural research as being made up 
of that demanded by the i-th state (given by Q^), and that demanded by the 
other n-1 states (Q ). That is: 
i —i Q - Q + Q 
Using this relation we can substitute for Q in the utility function 
- (Q -- Q^) 
—4 n A 
where Q - S Q-' . 
—i 
The associated Lagrangian, after substituting for Q in the utility 
function, is: 
C - y^' gi(Q^), hi(Q^)+ m(Q - Q^),E ) + 
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A[ - Pyy^ - PqQ^^ 
and the corresponding first-order conditions are: 
(1) Uy - APy - 0 , 
(2) g'i + (h'- m') Ug - APq - 0 , and 
(3) - Pyy^ - PqQ^ • ° • 
Substituting for À in equation (2) gives: 
g'i MRS^y + (h'i - m') MRS^y - Pq / Py -
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VII. APPENDIX B. TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
Table B.l Upper Central Region: Two-stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and r-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^^ ^"^it InSPILL^^ 
Illinois .581 1 .406 -1.177 0.041 0.929 
(3 .44) (-10.90) (1.45) (18.33) 
Indiana .700 0 .954 -1.454 0.088 0.878 
(1 .95) (-11.05) (1.48) (9.92) 
Iowa 0, 319 -1.248 0.011 1.004 
(1. 57) (-10.85) (0.19) (12.23) 
Kansas -0, 138 -1.277 0.172 0.845 
(-0. 77) (-11.08) (2.69) (10.44) 
Michigan . -0. 088 -1.168 0.043 1.000 
(-0. 39) (-12.28) (1.19) (15.60) 
Minnesota .493 0. 357 -1.088 0.006 0.960 
(2. 71) (-28.49) (0.62) (47.19) 
Missouri .478 0. 121 -1.429 0.087 0.919 
(0. 23) (-9.57) (1.05) (8.06) 
^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation 
occurs, p is used to transform the data. 
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Table B.l (Continued) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^^ InF^^ InSPILL^ 
Nebraska -0 .297 -1 .244 0 .135 0 .914 
(-1 .44) (-11 .49) (3 .33) (15 .73) 
Ohio 0 .896 -1 .240 0 .136 0 .781 
(3, .04) (-9, .69) (2, .93) (9, .46) 
South Dakota -0, 137 -1, 248 0, ,009 1. ,042 
(-0, 78) (-12, .25) (0. 53) (44, ,09) 
Wisconsin 0. 600 -1, 383 0. 023 0. 957 
(2. 34) (-9. ,06) (0. 99) (21. 77) 
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Table B.2. Northeast region: Two stage least squares estimates 
of the demand for SAES research, 1951-82. (Dependent 
variable is InQ^ and t-ratios are in parentheses) 
Regressors 
States Constant InP^ InF^ InSPILL^ 
C it it 
Connecticut 0.419 -0.967 -0 .014 0 .988 
(1.92) (-14.84) (-0 .56) (21 .09) 
Delaware -0.980 -0.980 -0 .004 0 .996 
(2.88) (-1.24) (-1 .24) (141 .26) 
Maine -0.019 -1.012 0 .017 0 .984 
(-0.65) (-88.47) (4 .76) (160 .76) 
Maryland -0.107 -0.965 -0 .006 1 .031 
(-0.63) (-22.02) (-0.49) (33 .88) 
Massachusetts 0,170 -1.039 -0 .024 1 .018 
(2.88) (-43.24) (-3 .32) (78 .35) 
New Hampshire -0.111 -1.017 -0, .011 1, .025 
(-2.69) (-95.55) (-3, ,08) (142 .50) 
New Jersey 0.433 -0.838 0. ,029 0, 949 
(1.05) (-8.75) (1. 22) (14. 83) 
New York 0.939 -1.160 0. 032 0. 881 
(2.66) (9.43) (0. 95) (11. 92) 
Pennsylvania 0.131 -0.867 0. 044 0. 953 
(0.96) (3.17) (3. 17) (32. 54) 
Rhode Island -0.063 -1.016 -0. 001 1. 009 
(-2.72) (-126.99) (-0. 75) (280. 19) 
Vermont -0.015 -0.998 0. 003 1. 001 
(-0.34) (-107.68) (0. 63) (120. 97) 
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VIII. APPENDIX C. ALTERNATIVE J-TEST METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of the JII test is the same as that of JI, except that 
the predicted value from the competing model is also corrected for 
autocorrelation in the model to be tested. The compound model for testing 
the Nash-Cournot model is: 
(1 - n)( 1 - p* ) + p* (In Q^_^) 
a (1 - 0) (In P - p* In P ) 
3l t 1 t-i 
+ ( 1. 0) (In Ef;. In 
+ a^.d - n) (In SPILLf - p* In SPILLf^). 
5l It 1 it-i 
+ a^ j, n (In - p* In , (III. 17) 
where is the predicted value of the autocorrelation coefficient. 
The hypothesis of the J test remain the same as in method JI. Results 
from using the JII procedure are presented in Tables C.l and C.2. 
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Table C.l. JII Test Results: South and East-Central Uplands Region 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
States InQ^^ t-ratio Conclusion InQ^^ t-ratio Conclusion 
Arkansas -0 .085 -18.14 Reject 0 .765 11 .71 Reject 
Alabama 1 .369 15.73 Reject 0 .884 12 .75 Reject 
Florida -0 .091 -20 .84 Reject 1 .061 176 .41 Reject 
Georgia -0 .164 -11 .83 Reject 1 .035 150 .68 Reject 
Illinois -0.162 -13 .80 Reject 1 .026 52.1 93 Reject 
Indiana -0 .047 -11 .79 Reject 1 .033 286 .10 Reject 
Kansas -0 .051 -5 .39 Reject 1 .074 133 .11 Reject 
Kentucky -0 .095 -14.33 Reject 1 .037 213 .45 Reject 
Louisiana -0 .076 -22 .54 Reject 1 .049 181 .64 Reject 
Mississippi -0, .071 -37.41 Rej ect 1, .104 82 .56 Reject 
Missouri -0, .123 -14.57 Reject 1, 041 156, .57 Reject 
N. Carolina -0, 123 -9, 77 Reject 1. ,003 114. ,04 Reject 
New Mexico -0, 035 -20, 76 Reject 1. 017 714. ,89 Reject 
Ohio -0. 066 -14, 08 Reject 1. 048 239. 39 Reject 
Oklahoma -0. 060 -23. 74 Reject 1. 027 197. 92 Reject 
S. Carolina -0. 058 -33. 49 Reject 1. 012 657. 58 Reject 
Tennessee -0. 114 -12. 95 Reject 1. 015 249. 08 Reject 
Texas 1. 174 18. 53 Reject 1. 295 21.18 Rej ect 
Virginia -0. 033 -5. 46 Reject 1. 028 237. 71 Reject 
W. Virginia -0. 027 -11. 92 Reject 1. 009 392. 59 Reject 
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Table C.2. JII Test Results: Upper Central Region 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
States InQ^^ t-ratio Conclusion InQ^^ t-ratio Conclusion 
Illinois 0 .263 3.33 Rej ect 0 .958 26 .05 Reject 
Indiana -0 .089 -24.86 Reject 1 .055 235 .73 Reject 
Iowa -0 .336 -23.14 Reject 1 .010 45 .42 Reject 
Kansas -0 .335 -20.70 Rej ect 1 .002 54 .15 Reject 
Michigan -0, 495 -28.16 Reject 1. ,023 45 .58 Reject 
Minnesot^, -1. ,904 -12.12 Reject 1, 032 280, ,28 Reject 
Missouri 0. 148 24.68 Reject 0. 801 16, ,56 Reject 
Nebraska -0. 362 -13.88 Reject 1. 005 83, ,82 Rej ect 
Ohio -0. 219 -2.70 Reject 1. 142 20. 19 Reject 
S. Dakota -0. 058 -2.84 Rej ect 1. Oil 150. 68 Reject 
Wisconsin -0, 191 -19.77 Reject 1. 036 309. 32 Reject 
161 
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akino, M. and Y. Hayami. "Efficiency and Equity in Public Research 
Rice Breeding in Japan's Economic Development." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics. 57 (1975): 1-10. 
Andreoni, J. "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy." 
Journal of Public Economics. 35 (1988): 57-73. 
Antonovitz, F. and R. Green. "Alternative Estimates of FED Beef Supply 
Response to Risk". Unpublished manuscript. Department of 
Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 1989. 
Backus, D. "Empirical Models of the Exchange Rate: Separating Wheat 
from the Chaff." Canadian Journal of Economics. 17 (1984): 
824-46. 
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian. "On the Private 
Provision of Public Goods." Journal of Public Economics. 29 
(1986): 25-49. 
Bernake, B., H. Bohn and P. Reiss. "Alternative Non-Nested 
Specification Tests of Time-Series Investment Models." Journal 
of Econometrics. 37 (1988): 293-326. 
Braha, H., and L. Tweeton. "Evaluating Past and Prospective Future 
Payoffs from Public Investments to Increase Agricultural 
Productivity." Oklahoma State University, Technical Bulletin 
T-163, 1986. 
152 
Bresnahan, T. F. "Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures." 
Economic Review 71 (1981): 934-45. 
Cline, P. "Sources of Productivity Change in U.S. Agriculture," Ph.D. 
diss. Oklahoma State University, 1975. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler. "The Simple Analytics of Pure Public Good 
Provision." Economica. 52 (1985): 103-16. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler. "Easy Riders, Joint Production, and 
Public Goods." Economic Journal. 94 (1984a): 580-98. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler. "The Theory of Public Goods: Non-
Nash Behaviour." Journal of Public Economics. 23 (1984b); 
367-79. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler. The Theory of Externalities. Public 
Goods. and Club Goods. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1986. 
Davidson, R, and J. Mackinnon. "Several Tests for Model Specification 
in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses." Econometrica. 49 
(1981): 781-93. 
Davidson, R. and J. Mackinnon. "Some Non-Nested Hypothesis Tests and 
the Relations Among Them." Review of Economic Studies. 49 (1982): 
551-65. 
Davidson, R., D. F. Hendry, F. Srba, and S. Yeo. "Econometric Modeling 
of the Aggregate Time Series Relationship Between Consumers' 
Expenditure and Income in the U.K." Economic Journal. 88 (1978): 
661-92. 
163 
Deaton, A. S. "Specification and Testing in Applied Demand Analysis." 
Economic Journal. 88 (1978): 524-36. 
de Janvry, A. and Jean-Jacques Dethier. Technological Innovation in 
Agriculture: The Political Economy of Its Rate and Bias. Study 
Paper No. 1. CGIAR, The World Bank, 1985. 
Evenson, R. "The Contribution of Agricultural Research and 
Extension to Agricultural Production," Ph.D. diss. University of 
Chicago, 1968. 
Evenson, R. and S. Rose-Ackerman. "The Political Economy of 
Agricultural Research and Extension Grants, Votes, and 
Reapportionment." American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 67 
(1985): 1-14. 
Evenson, R., P. Waggoner and V. Ruttan. "Economic Benefits 
from Research: An Example from Agriculture." Science. 205 
(September 14, 1979): 1101-7. 
Foley, D. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public 
Goods." Econometrica. 38 (1970): 66-72. 
Godfrey, L. G. and M. H. Pesaran. "Tests of Non-Nested Regression 
Models: Small Sample Adjustments and Monte-Carlo Evidence." Journal 
of Econometrics 21 (1983): 133-54. 
Griliches, Z. "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and 
Related Innovations." Journal of Political Economy. 66 (1958): 
419-31. 
Guttman, J. "Interest Groups and Demand for Agricultural Research." 
Journal of Political Economy. 86 (1978): 467-84. 
164 
Hendry, D. F. and J. Richard. "On the Formulation of Empirical Models 
in Dynamic Econometrics." Journal of Econometrics 20 (1983): 3-
33. 
Hertford, R. and A. Schmitz. "Measuring Economic Returns to 
Agricultural Research." In Resource Allocation and Productivity in 
National and International Agricultural Research, ed. T. M. Arndt, 
D. G. Dalrymple, and V. Ruttan. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977. 
Huffman, W. and R. Evenson. The Development of U.S. Agricultural 
Research and Education: An Economic Perspective. Forthcoming. 
Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
Huffman, W. and J. Miranowski." An Economic Analysis of Expenditures 
on Agricultural Experiment Station Research." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 63 (1981): 105-118. 
Judd, M. A., J. Boyce, and R. Evenson. "Investing in 
Agricultural Supply: The Determinants of Investment in Agricultural 
Research and Extension." Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
35 (1986): 77-113. 
Kuznets, S. "Two Centuries of Economic Growth; Reflections on U.S. 
Experience." American Economic Review. 67 (1977): 1-14. 
Llndahl, E. "Just Taxation - a Positive Solution." In Classics in the 
Theory of Public Finance, ed. R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock. 
London: Macmlllan, 1958. 
165 
Linder, R. and F. Jarrett. "Supply Shifts and the Size of Research 
Benefits." American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 60 
(February, 1978): 85-93. 
Maddala, G. Introduction to Econometrics. New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1988. 
Margolis, J. "A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures." 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 37 (1955); 347-49. 
McAleer, M., G. Fisher and P. Volker. "Statistical Inference in 
Non-Nested Econometric Models." Review of Economics and Statistics 
64 (1982): 572-83. 
McGuire, M. "Mixed Public-Private Benefit and Public Good Supply Good 
with an Application to the NATO Alliance." Defense Economics. 1 
(January, 1990): 17-35. 
McGuire, M. and C. Groth. "A Method for Identifying the Public Good 
Allocation Process Within a Group." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
100 (1985): 915-34. 
Murdoch, J. and T. Sandler. "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of 
NATO." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 26 (1982): 237-63. 
Murdoch, J. and T. Sandler. "Complementary Free Riding, and the 
Military Expenditures of NATO Allies." Journal of Public 
Economics. 25 (1984): 83-101. 
Murdoch, J, and T. Sandler. "The Political Economy of Scandinavian 
Neutrality." The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 88 (1986): 
583-603. 
166 
Murdoch, J. and T. Sandler. "Nash-Cournot or Lindahl Behavior?: 
An Empirical Test for NATO Allies." Unpublished manuscript. Iowa 
State University, Ames, Iowa, 1989. 
Norton, G. and J. Davis. "Evaluating Returns to Agricultural 
Research: A Review." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 63 (1981): 685-99. 
Oakland, W. H. "Joint Goods." Economics. 36 (1969): 253-68. 
Pardey P., B. Craig and M. Hallaway. "U.S. Agricultural Research 
Deflators: 1890-1985." Staff Papers Series. Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, 
St. Paul, Minnesota, 1987. 
Pesaran, M. H. "A Critique of the Proposed Tests of Natural Rate-
Rational Expectations Hypothesis," Economic Journal. 92 (1982a): 
529-54. 
Pesaran, M. H. "On the Comprehensive Method of Testing Non-Nested 
Regression Models." Journal of Econometrics. 18 (1982b): 263-74. 
Pesaran, M. H. "Non-Nested Hypothesis Testing." In The New Palgrave: 
A Dictionary of Economics, ed., John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and 
Peter Newman. London: Macmillan Press, 1986. 
Peterson, W. L. "Return to Poultry Research in the United States." 
Journal of Farm Economics. 49 (August 1967): 656-69. 
Posnett, J. and T. Sandler. "Joint Supply and the Finance of 
Charitable Activity," Public Finance Quarterly. 14 (April 1986): 
209-22. 
167 
Pray, G. E. "The Economics of Agricultural Research in the British 
Punjab and Pakistani Pumjab, 1905-1975." Ph.D. diss. University 
of Pennsylvania, 1978. 
Roberts, J. "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of 
Public Goods." Review of Economic Studies. 46 (1979): 283-92. 
Rose, R. N. "Supply Shifts and Research Benefits." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics. 62 (November, 1980): 237-45. 
Ruttan, V. Agricultural Research Policy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984. 
Ruttan, V. W. Agricultural Research Policy and Development. Rome: 
FAG, 1987. 
Samuelson, P. A. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures." Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 36 (November, 1954): 387-9. 
Schultz, T. "The Allocation of Resources to Research." In Resource 
Allocation in Agricultural Research, ed. W, L. Fisher. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971. 
Scobie, G. "Variation in the Rates of Return to Agricultural 
Research." Mimeograph. Food Foundation Workshop, Washington D.C., 
1979. 
Truchon, M. "Nonmyopic Strategic Behavior in the MDP Planning 
Procedure." Econometrica. 52 (1986): 1179-89. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Cooperative State Research 
Service. Funds for Research in State Agricultural Experiment 
Stations and Other State Institutions. Washington, D.C.: USDA, 
GSRS, various years. 
168 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Cooperative State Research Service. 
Inventory of Agricultural Research. Washington, D.C.: USDA, GSRS, 
various issues. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Cooperative State Research Service. 
Yearbook of Agriculture . Washington, D.C.iUSDA, GSRS, 1957. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract. Washington, D.C.; 
U.S. Government Printing Office, various years. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Historical 
Statistics of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. 
Warr, P. "The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent 
of the Distribution of Income." Economic Letters. 13 (1983): 
207-11. 
White, F. and J. Havlicek. "Optimal Expenditures for Agricultural 
Research and Extension; Implications of Underfunding." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 64 (1982): 47-55. 
Wicksell, K. "A New Principle of Just Taxation." In Classics in the 
Theory of Public Finance. 2nd edn., ed. R. A. Musgrave and A. T. 
Peacock. London: Macmillan, 1967. 
